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FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
Joseph W. McKnight*
I. STATUS
A. Computing Degrees of Relationship
HE most radical change in the Texas law of status relates to the mode
of counting degrees of relationship in both civil and criminal mat-
ters.1 This change affects the law of husband and wife only tangen-
tially (but pervasively) and is only notable here because of the intimate
relationship of these rules to the law of marriage since at least the fifteenth
century. In his book on Tenures, Thomas Littleton2 said that descent to land
was controlled by the canonical mode of counting degrees of relationship
ordinarily used for conputing kinship of a couple allowed to marry. The rule
resulted from an extension of the law of marriage to the law of succession to
lands under marriage contracts and thence to succession to lands generally.
By an analogy to the prohibited degrees of marriages 3 which, though tempo-
* B.A., University of Texas; M.A., B.C.L., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Professor of Law and Larry and Jane Harlan Faculty Fellow, Southern Methodist
University.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5996a, 5996c, 5996h, 5996i (Vernon Supp. 1992);
TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 201.202(3), 252.023(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 72.001 (Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. arts. 19.08,
30.01, 35.16(b),(c), 42.141 (Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.916(a),
86.52(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.031(b), 32.054(a), 33.033(a),
102.003(c), 103.001(a), 243.007(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 21.005,
52.011 (d), 62.105, 82.066, 404.011 (d), 415.093(d), 415.114, 495.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 193.007(c), 242.002(6), 246.002(3), 402.014,
713.010, 713.025 (Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 50.004(h), 51.002(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 171.002(c), 212.017(c), 232.0048(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 25.07(b), 32.441(c), 38.01(8) (Vernon
Supp. 1992); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 6.035(a)-(c), 6.05(f),(g), 6.412, 41.69 (Vernon Supp.
1992); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 130E(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 50.023(a), 50.026(a), 51.0851(a), 51.235(a), 53.0721(a), 53.089(e), 54.1231(a), 57.262
(Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 41a-1, 46c-3, 135b-6, 179d §§ 13(q),
13b(c), 13e(a), 19(d), 179e §§ 205, 6.16, 342-104, 342-214, 2461-11.08, 3271a § 4(b),
4413(29cc), 4413(36) §§ 203(b), 209(f), 4442d § 3A(1), 4495b § 2.09(f), 4512b § 3(e), 4512c
§ 5(g), 4512e § 2(h), 4512g § 4(e)-(f), 4512j § 3(a), 4513 § 3, 4528c § 5(d), 4542a-1 § 8(a),
4542a-1 § 15(c), 4543 § 3, 4552 § 2.02(c), 4566 § 102(g), 4568(c), 4582b §§ 2A(3),(4), 5155
§ 1(3), 5221b-5 § 7(c)(7)(A)(iii), 5282c § 7(a), 6243-101 § 4(b), 6252-9b § 4(c), 6252-1Ic § 6A,
7621e § 6(d), 8280c § 4.07(a), 8470a §§ 29B(a)(b), 8451a § 7(a),(b), 8751 § 4, 8851 § 3(d),
8890 § 5(1) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
2. THOMAS LIFLETON, TENURES 1.20, at 9-10 (circa 1481) (Eugene Wambaugh, ed.
1903).
3. The canon law mode of counting, and the civil law mode (until now in effect in Texas
since the adoption of English law), are well illustrated by computing the degrees of relation-
ship between a decedent and his brother's grandson by both systems. The continuous civil
count is made by counting upward from the decedent through the nearest common ancestor
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rally germane to marriage settlements, were not very well suited to regulate
succession in any context, old English law embraced a rule which the more
sophisicated continental legal systems avoided.4 In the nineteenth century
most American jurisdictions took their law of descent to land from the conti-
nental rule,5 which had been appropriated by the English statute for the
distribution of personalty, 6 but Texas followed the pattern of old English
common law which employed the canonical degrees of prohibited marriage
for that and other purposes.7 Most of the profession in Texas was unaware of
this peculiarity of Texas law because disputes involving the rule arose so
rarely. In relation to property, the issue arose in matters of intestate succ-
cession to a decedent who had no direct descendant or parent and in relation
to the disqualification of a judge or juror in a criminal case who was related
within the third degree to the crime-victim. The problem did not arise in
connection with marriage because the prohibited degrees were statutorily
defined in a manner different from the canonical system. The issue was
brought to a head in 1990 in a case before the First court of appeals.8 As a
result of that case, two Houston legislators introduced a bill by which Texas
law was changed so that degrees of relationship are now counted by the civil
law system for all purposes.9 The result of amending the mode of counting
degrees without changing the degrees is to shrink the scope of the former
statute for whatever purpose it was intended.
and on to the brother's grandson: the parent of the decedent (first degree), the brother (second
degree), the brother's son (third degree) and the brother's grandson (fourth degree). Using the
broken canon law method the count also begins with the parent of the decedent (first degree).
Because the decedent's parent is the common ancestor of the decedent and the brother's grand-
son, the count breaks there at the second degree, and a new count is made to the common
ancestor from the brother's grandson: the brother's son (first degree), the brother (second de-
gree) and the common ancestor (third degree). Because the two counts are different, the de-
gree of relationship is the greater of the two. Thus, by the continuous civil count the decedent
and the brother's grandson are related in the fourth degree, whereas by the broken canon law
method of counting they are related in the third degree.
4. Continental legal systems followed the Roman civil law method of counting degrees of
relationships for purposes of succession but used the canonical system of counting the prohib-
ited degrees of consanguinity for the purpose of marriage.
5. See, e.g., TAPPING REEVE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DESCENT IN THE SEVERAL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 389-515 (1825).
6. 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 10, § 3 (1670).
7. Indemnity Insurance Co. v. McGee, 163 Tex. 412, 414, 356 S.W. 2d 666, 667 (1962);
Whitworth v. Bynum, 679 S.W. 2d 608, 610-11 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, rev'd on
other grounds, 669 S.W. 2d 194 (Tex. 1985); Warner v. Rice, 541 S.W. 2d 896, 898-99 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ); Jernigan v. Lauderdale, 73 Sw. 39, 41-42 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1903), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Witherspoon v. Jernigan, 97 Tex.
98, 76 S.W. 445 (1903); Baker v. McRimmon, 48 S.W. 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1899,
no writ).
8. The case is unreported but was apprently a prosecution for sheltering a runaway child.
Under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.07 (Vernon Supp. 1992) a relative within the second
degree is not guilty of the crime. See also O'Connor v. Smith, 815 S.W. 2d 338, 346 n. I (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
9. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5996h (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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B. Informal Marriage
In Winfield v. Renfro 10 it was alleged that the couple contracted an infor-
mal marriage "on or about April 11, 1982." 11 Although the 1989 amend-
ment to Texas Family Code section 1.91 was inapplicable to the case, 12 it is
evident from the reference to the agreement to marry that the appellate
court was conscious of the amendment. The proof of the marriage did not
turn on the agreement to be married, however, but on the couple's holding
themselves out to others as being married. There was apparently no serious
argument that the couple agreed to be married on April 11, 1982 and that
they cohabited as husband and wife thereafter from time to time, though
they were not together again until August 1982. The man was a well-known
baseball player who, according to the woman, instructed her not to represent
herself as married. Thus, only her relatives and acquaintances were aware of
the secret. On April 11, 1982 the man registered them as a married couple
at a hotel where they stayed for three days. In light of current mores, the
majority of the court held that "a three-day stay in a hotel with a person of
the opposite sex is not enough to establish the element of holding out as
married." 13 Thereafter, "only [the woman] did anything, and she did not do
much, that could be interpreted as holding them out as married in 1982 and
in 1983. [The man] did not tell anyone he was married and nothing in the
record contradicts him on this point, not even [the testimony of the wo-
man]." 14 The majority of the court seemed somewhat embarrassed by its
earlier decision in In re Estate of Giessel.15 Giessell was a succession case in
which the Houston court sustained the probate court's finding of an informal
marriage, though the man had steadfastly denied the fact to his close associ-
ates over twenty years of cohabitation. In Winfield evidence indicated that
during a trip to the Bahamas, the man's acts could have been interpreted as
holding the woman out as his wife. The majority of the court, however,
stressed the point that, under the language of the statute, holding out must
occur in Texas and that failure to make this point clear in the jury charge
constituted reversible error.16 The other striking point of the majority deci-
sion was its insistence that sufficient evidence to establish each essential ele-
ment of an informal marriage must occur in close proximity to the date on
which the marriage was alleged to have occurred. 17 The dissenting judge
10. 821 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
11. Id. at 643.
12. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91 (Vernon Supp. 1992). In 1989 the legislature repealed
the provision that if (1) living together as husband and wife and (2) holding each other out to
the public as married were proved, the court might infer an agreement to be married. The
marriage in Winfield was not only alleged to have occurred prior to the 1989 amendment, but
the trial also commenced prior to the enactment. See Winfield v. Daggett, 775 S.W.2d 431
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
13. 821 S.W.2d at 651.
14. Id.
15. 734 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw.
L.J. 1, 2 (1988).
16. 821 S.W.2d at 644.
17. Id. at 648.
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took a different view: that it is sufficient if later facts corroborate the allega-
tion of an earlier marriage. 18
In Mossier v. Shields 19 the assertion of an informal marriage arose in the
context of enforcing a disciplinary sanction. The suit to establish an infor-
mal marriage was brought after a prior suit on the same claim had been
dismissed with prejudice for discovery abuse under Rule 215(2)(b)(5). 20 The
court of appeals had allowed the appeal from the trial court's refusal to hear
the evidence on the ground that the trial court's decision "forever barred
[the spouses] from obtaining a divorce."'2' The Texas supreme court pointed
out that the lower court's conclusion that the decree "created a life sentence
in marriage" rested on a misapprehension of the burden of proof: the dis-
missal merely precluded a party from asserting the existence of an informal
marriage. 22 The supreme court went on to point out that the legislature also
indicated in its 1989 amendment to section 1.91 a policy barring claims of an
informal marriage brought more than one year after the cohabital relation-
ship ends.
C Annulment
Husband v. Pierce23 demonstrates that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus without a prior adjudication of annulment does not give non-con-
senting parents a quick means of breaking up an underage child's asserted
informal marriage. A man and a girl of fifteen entered into a formal mar-
riage in Mexico without her parents' consent. On the couple's return to
their home in east Texas the girl's parents sought a writ of habeas corpus for
possession of their daughter. The trial court granted the writ. Although the
parents also brought a suit for annulment of the marriage and the man was
served at the habeas corpus hearing, that suit was severed for a later hearing.
In response to the court's order, the man responded with a petition to the
court of appeals for a mandamus to compel the trial judge to vacate the writ
of habeas corpus. In addition to asserting the validity of their Mexican mar-
riage, the couple also asserted an informal marriage under Texas law. Sus-
taining the prima facie validity of the Mexican ceremonial marriage as
entered into with apparent requisite formalities but, nevertheless, subject to
annulment for non-age of one of the parties,24 the appellate court went on to
say that the Texas informal marriage was valid but subject to attack for lack
of parental consent. 25 In either case the daughter was emancipated by mar-
riage and therefore was not subject to a writ of habeas corpus for forcible
return to her parents as a minor. 26
18. Id. at 656 (Mirabal, Jd., dissenting).
19. 818 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1991).
20. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(5).
21. 810 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd, 818 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1991).
22. 818 S.W.2d at 754.
23. 800 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
24. Id. at 664.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 663-64. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
1834 [Vol. 45
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In putting its primary reliance on the validity of the Mexican ceremonial
marriage, the court relied on the law of the place of marriage as the basic
principle governing the validity of a foreign contract in a conflict of laws
context.2 7 That principle must now be regarded as superseded by the most
significant contacts doctrine. 28 Thus, the law of the place of contracting,
with which neither contracting party had any significant contact apart from
proximity by air-flight from Texas, should have little bearing on their perma-
nent status when they intended, as the couple evidently did, to maintain
their domiciles in Texas. On the part of such a runaway couple, therefore,
primary reliance should be put on the validity of the Texas informal mar-
riage rather than on the Mexican ceremonial marriage. Although the court
seemed to treat sections 2.03 (Ceremony Conducted by Unauthorized Per-
son) 29 and 2.41 (Underage [Voidable Marriage]) 30 as applicable to the Mexi-
can ceremonial marriage,31 there is considerable doubt that the terms of
those sections are properly applicable to non-Texas marriages. 32
In Kerckhoff v. Kerckhoff33 the husband, through a next friend, petitioned
to annul his marriage on the ground of mental incompetence. This is the
first reported Texas case on this point, although in Coulter v. Melady34 the
heirs of one of the parties made an unsuccessful effort to declare a marriage
void on the ground of lack of consent of a party. There, the facts shown did
not support the argument. In Kerckhoff the court held that the facts, includ-
ing evidence of the husband's later incompetency from which his condition
at the time of the marriage might be reasonably inferred, were sufficient to
show that he suffered from an organic brain disease.
D. Suit to Declare a Marriage Void
To show a prior marriage as the ground for a declaration of a void mar-
riage, it is not enough to demonstrate that a spouse was previously married
and not divorced. It is also necessary to show that the marriage was not
dissolved by the death of the other spouse. In Loera v. Loera 35 the wife
married in 1958 and was immediately abandoned by her husband, whom she
did not see again. She married her second husband in 1977, and he sought
avoidance of the marriage on the ground of a continuing prior marriage.3 6
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decree of nullity because the
second husband failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed by Family
27. 800 S.W.2d at 663.
28. Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., 817 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. 1991); Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1984).
29. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.03 (Vernon 1975).
30. Id. § 2.41 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
31. 800 S.W.2d at 664.
32. See HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
127-31 (2d ed. 1987); ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 111-13 (3d ed.
1986).
33. 805 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, n.w.h.).
34. 489 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 823 (1973).
35. 815 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.).
36. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Vernon 1975).
1992] 1835
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Code section 2.01 (State Policy [Favoring Validity of More Recent Mar-
riage]). 37 Although there was conflicting evidence that the prior marriage
had been dissolved by divorce, the husband introduced no evidence that the
first husband was still alive. As a matter of law, the court said, he was pre-
sumed dead after a seven years' absence. 38
E. Alienation of Affection
Although the Texas legislature abolished the cause of action for alienation
of affection prospectively in 1987,39 the appellate courts continue to consider
cases filed before the effective date of the statute. In DeLeon v. Hernandez,4°
for example, the court concluded that the plaintiff-wife's cause of action for
alienation of affection was not affected by evidence that the husband had a
sexual relationship with another woman prior to that with the defendant. 4'
F Intentional Torts and Emotional Distress
One of the principal objects of the legislative abolition of the cause of
action for alienation of affection was recognition of the freedom of each
spouse to engage in extramarital sexual relationship without putting liability
on his or her paramour as a consequence. Ironically, not long after the pas-
sage of this legislation, great pressure was put on the appellate courts to
recognize expanded liability for intentional and negligent infliction of harm
by one spouse on the other. In addition to the suit for alienation of affection
in DeLeon, the emotionally wounded wife also asserted a cause of action
against her husband for both assault and false imprisonment, actions which
the court held were unaffected by the plaintiff's failure to seek medical treat-
ment or police protection at the time of the alleged acts.42
In Price v. Price43 the Texas supreme court specifically recognized the
demise of the doctrine of interspousal immunity and in Stafford v. Stafford 44
the court recognized that the transmission of an infectious disease, such as
genital herpes, between spouses supports a cause of action against the trans-
mitting spouse. The court had already pronounced in Bounds v. Caudle,45
which involved a suit by the wife's heirs to recover for wrongful death
against her husband, that the interspousal immunity doctrine did not apply.
In her suit for divorce in Flores v. Lively46 the wife also asserted a cause of
action for personal injury resulting from genital herpes. The couple had
been married in 1981 and in 1982 the husband was diagnosed as having the
disease. Although both spouses were advised by a physician of ways to mini-
37. 815 S.W.2d at 912 (relying on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01).
38. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 133.001 (Vernon Supp. 1991)).
39. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.06 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
40. 814 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
41. Id. at 533-34.
42. Id. at 533.
43. 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987).
44. 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1987).
45. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
46. 818 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.).
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mize transmission of the disease to the wife, in January 1983 the wife was
also diagnosed as infected. The suit for divorce and the suit for personal
injury were filed in April 1989. The husband pleaded the two-year statute of
limitation against the personal injury claim and his argument was sustained
by a majority of the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals.47 The court reasoned
that the wife's suit should have been filed no later than January, 1985.
Although the Price case was not decided until 1987, the limitations period
had begun to run on the cause of action in 1983. The decision in Price did
not create a new cause of action but merely recognized the disappearance of
a defense, which might or might not have been raised by the husband.48
G. Criminal Interference with Personal Rights of Other Spouse
Criminal prosecutions for disregarding the public duty of support 49 have
greatly outnumbered those for interspousal acts which violate the rights of
personal security, though the recent legislative act removing the bar to pros-
ecution for interspousal rape indicates a growing concern for such matters.50
Instances in which either civil or criminal sanctions have been sought for
interference with the separate property rights of one spouse by the other
have also been rare, though the ordinary rules of trespass, conversion, theft,
and arson are clearly applicable. Although from the mid-nineteenth century
Texas courts have recognized a civil action to restrain the wrongful disposi-
tion by one spouse of the community share of the other spouse,51 recovery
for one spouse's destruction or other wrongful dealing with the other
spouse's interest in community property presents difficult conceptual
problems beyond a right of reimbursement. Davis v. State52 was a prosecu-
tion for wrongful entry by an estranged spouse into the apartment of the
other spouse. The lessee-spouse had brought suit for divorce and her ten-
ancy was a community property interest, but the interference, nonetheless,
constituted a breach of personal security. Under the terms of Family Code
section 5.22(a) 53 the wife clearly had management of the property, and she
had given her husband notice not to come onto the property as specified in
Penal Code section 30.0354 as a requisite to a criminal trespass prosecution.
That the divorce court had not given him further notice by way of a re-
straining order was irrelevant. 55
47. Id. at 462. The Corpus Christi court did not mention Bounds v. Caudle, though it was
an appeal from that court.
48. Id.
49. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05 (Vernon 1989).
50. Id. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
51. See Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211, 215 (1855); Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S.W.2d 1219,
1221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, no writ); Bettis v. Bettis, 83 S.W.2d 1076,1078 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, no writ); Moore v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 67
S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934, writ dism'd by agreement); Coss v. Coss,
207 S.W. 127, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ).
52. 799 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ ref'd).
53. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a) (Vernon 1975).
54. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (Vernon 1989).
55. 799 S.W.2d at 400. See Stanley v. State, 631 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
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Kent v. State56 was an appeal from the revocation of probation of a con-
victed felon for a violation of the criminal wiretap statute.5 7 The prisoner
was charged with placing an unauthorized listening device on his home tele-
phone so that he might intercept his wife's telephone conversations at his
place of business half a mile away. The prisoner argued that no violation of
the statute had occurred and cited Simpson v. Simpson,58 where the Fifth
Circuit court of appeals construed the federal anti-wiretapping statute59 (on
which the Texas statute is based) as not applicable to an interspousal wiretap
to monitor a residential telephone within the family home. The Dallas court
of appeals held that the Texas statute nevertheless prohibited all wiretapping
not specifically permitted. Because interspousal wiretapping is not excepted
under Texas law, the statute encompassed the offense.6°
H. Privileged Testimony
The doctrine of privileged marital communication now has a very narrow
scope in criminal cases. The marital privilege may be asserted only by the
spouse, not by the accused, and a spouse or former spouse is allowed to
testify against a prisoner, even if the offense occurred before the adoption of
the present Rules of Criminal Evidence.61 In Boyle v. State62 this point was
reiterated. The testimony of the prisoner's wife concerned events which oc-
curred before the promulgation of the new rule on September 1, 1986. The
trial took place after that date. As a procedural provision, the rule was ap-
plicable though it was not in force when the offense occurred. 63 The pris-
oner testified voluntarily and thus the testimony was admissible.64
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. Premarital and Marital Partitions
It has become increasingly common over the last three decades for the
drafters of Texas civil statutes to include an effective-date clause and some-
times a provision that a statute is applicable, or inapplicable, to particular
disputes, usually defined in terms of the date on which a suit is initiated. In
the absence of an effective-date clause for later effectiveness, an ordinary act
takes effect ninety days after the close of the session at which it was en-
acted. 65 A statute that is designated as an emergency act and receives a
recorded affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of both legislative
56. 809 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, n.w.h.).
57. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 16.02 (Vernon 1989).
58. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988).
60. 809 S.W.2d at 668.
61. TEX. R. CRIM. EviD. 504. See Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1990, no writ).
62. 820 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1297 (1992).
63. Id. at 144.
64. Id. at 145.
65. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 39.
1838 [Vol. 45
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houses, however, becomes effective immediately on passage. 66
The effective date of a constitutional amendment is less clearly defined,
and the provisions of the Texas Constitution offer little guidance.67 The
Texas Constitution merely states that after a constitutional amendment has
been ratified by the electorate, it shall be proclaimed by the Governor,68 but
the gubernatorial proclamation has been long acknowledged as having no
bearing on the effectiveness of the amendment. 69 The provision of the Elec-
tion Code on the canvassing of election ballots seems to supply the effective
date. 70
During the Texas supreme court's terms of 1987 through 1989, the court
decided two cases71 concerning the applicability of statutes to contracts in
general and to premarital and marital partitions in particular. In Wesseley
Energy Corp. v. Jennings72 the court laid down the general rule that the law
in force at the time a contract is made is a part of the contract and is there-
fore properly consulted in the interpretation of the contract. In a later mari-
tal partition case,73 however, the court said that the governing procedural
law was that in effect at the time "the divorce decree was signed."' 74 The
statute in issue in that case dealt with the burden of proof.7 5 The substantive
law applicable to the dispute would be that in effect at the time the transac-
tion occurred. Lower courts76 construed the later opinion as laying down a
general rule that the procedural law in effect at trial provides the governing
law for the trial of disputes involving premarital and marital partitions.
It was in this somewhat uncertain state of the law that the Texas supreme
court decided Beck v. Beck, 77 a case concerning a premarital partition en-
tered into prior to the constitutional amendment of 1980, which allowed the
making of premarital partitions to alter the character of future acquisitions
of community property. In an ingeniously well-crafted opinion by Justice
Cornyn,78 the court concluded that the 1980 amendment was meant to have
retrospective effect to validate prior premarital partitions affecting future
66. Id.
67. TEX. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1,2.
68. Id.
69. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 n.44 (1989).
70. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 67.012 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
71. Sadler v. Sadler, 769 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1989); Wesseley Energy Corp. v. Jennings, 736
S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1987).
72. 736 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1987).
73. Sadler, 769 S.W.2d 886.
74. Id. at 887.
75. A more precise wording of the rule is that the procedure governing the trial is that in
effect when the suit was initiated. In Sadler the law at trial and that when the suit began and
ended were identical. 769 S.W.2d at 886. It was not until after Sadler was appealed that the
burden of proof was changed. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.55 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
76. See Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no
writ); Daniel v. Daniel, 779 S.W.2d 110, 113 n.3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no
writ).




marital acquisitions. 79 Because the record was silent on the legislative intent
in proposing the amendment, the court took judicial notice of an ambiguous
fragment of testimony before the House Committee on Constitutional
Amendments80 to fill the void. 81 Although two members of the court were
then sitting in the Senate and therefore may have been aware of the thoughts
of their colleagues in this regard, there was no intent on the part of the
drafters of the amendment and no discussions between them and the legisla-
tive sponsors of the amendment that the amendment should have retrospec-
tive effect. After the adoption of the amendment, its principal draftsman
published an essay 82 in which he suggested an argument that might be made
to support retrospective effect of the amendment, provided that no vested
rights were thereby affected.8 3 It is with this issue of vested rights that the
opinion is most skillfully expressed. The court's argument was that there
was no vested right standing in the way of retrospective effect of the amend-
ment because the preamendment partition was merely voidable but not
void.8 4 This interpretation of a constitutionally inhibited act, previously so
termed by the court,85 is nevertheless unconvincing. It was, in fact, the
court's forthright statement of 1977 that such transactions were void8 6 (al-
beit in an obiter dictum) that impelled the constitutional amendment; the
federal district court's opinion in Castleberry v. Commissioner 87 merely pro-
vided the opportunity for the amendment. The 1980 constitutional amend-
ment was unnecessary unless such partitions were ineffective, and the bench
and bar were in agreement that the Texas supreme court had stated authori-
tatively that they were void, in reliance on Arnold v. Leonard.88
The most troubling aspect of Beck relates to constitutional interpretation
and not to Texas matrimonial property law, which should only be temporar-
ily affected by the decision. Justice Cook emphasized the constitutional
problem in a concurring opinion:89 "This doctrine [of retroactive validation]
should be used only where the public policy is so clearly and broadly stated
as to be unmistakable. The amendment of the state constitution to allow
79. Id. at 748.
80. Id.
81. It has been suggested in Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective:
Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1001, 1106 (1991), that the intention of the electorate
may also be relevant to the interpretation of constitutional amendments, but finding that intent
is even more conjectural than discerning the intent of the legislature in proposing an
amendment.
82. Joseph W. McKnight, The Constitutional Redefinition of Texas Matrimonial Property
As It Affects Antenuptial and Interspousal Transactions, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 449 (1982).
83. Id. at 474. It was perhaps irresponsible on the author's part not to note that a situa-
tion in which rights were not vested contrary to the purport of the partition would be hard to
imagine.
84. 814 S.W.2d at 749.
85. Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1978).
86. Id.
87. 68 T.C. 682 (1977), rev'd, 610 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1980).
88. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925). The court might have also cited Burton v. Bell,
380 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex. 1964), and Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933, judgm't adopted).
89. 814 S.W.2d at 750.
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recharacterization of property is such an instance."'9 Justice Cook's fears
are borne out in Haynes v. Stripling,91 where the Eastland Court of Appeals
found retrospective effect for the 1987 constitutional amendment allowing
spousal agreements for the survivor's succession to community property in
the mere legislative perception of a need for change and the fact that the
legislature later implemented the amendment by statute. 92 The court then
stated that "no vested rights have been impaired."'93 One wonders how that
court defines a vested right.
The number of instances of pre-1980 purported premarital partitions af-
fected by the Beck decision is likely very few.94 A continuing problem, how-
ever, is the interpretation of premarital and marital partitions entered into
after 1980. In Scott v. Scott 9 5 the premarital partition agreement defined the
process by which future income from both spouses' separate property would
be the separate property of each: either party "may deposit ... excess in-
come and revenue to the corpus of [his or her] separate property and such
funds shall then become the separate property of the spouse whose separate
property produced such income or revenue."' 96 Thus, by future acts "to cap-
italize the income" a spouse might make the income his or her separate
property. The court held that merely saving and investing such income in
making payments on a home did not comply with the process defined in the
partition agreement. 97 The court's interpretation of the partition agreement
should serve as a warning that if future acts of the parties are used to desig-
nate separate property, they should be carefully defined and a client should
be advised that the provisions should be carefully followed. Formulation of
an agreement in terms of the effects of future acts should also be avoided
when possible. To obviate estate (and possible future gift) tax problems, a
partition should be put in terms of a present partition of a future acquisi-
tion.98 Use of verbs of the present tense in referring to the process of parti-
tion and avoiding words of future connotation, such as "then", should be
practiced in the formulation of the instrument.
A trust agreement which the court took for a marital partition was dis-
cussed in Pearce v. Pearce.99 During marriage the husband and wife and the
husband's son entered into a trust agreement by which it was provided that
90. Id. The public policy to which Justice Cook refers is adverted to by Justice Comyn
with a quotation from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. c (1981). 814
S.W.2d at 749.
91. 812 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, n.w.h.)
92. Id. at 399-400. A bizarrely inaccurate account of Texas legal history compiled by a
legislative aide and attached to Senate Joint Resolution 35 is quoted by the court to support its
conclusion. Id. at 399.
93. Id. at 399.
94. Instances have nevertheless been heard of from the late 1970s when lawyers advised
their clients that they might safely execute unwanted premarital partitions because such parti-
tions were void. One of these instances might still be litigated.
95. 805 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ denied).
96. Id. at 837-38.
97. Id. at 838.
98. See McKnight, supra note 82, at 468-69.
99. 1991 WL 250884 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, n.w.h.)
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the income from the trust corpus contributed by the husband would be the
separate property of the husband. The validity of the transaction, therefore,
did not rest on the marital partition or exchange provision of the Texas Con-
stitution'00 but on the provision that allows spouses to agree in writing that
the income from the separate property of one of them will be the owner's
separate property.' 0 1
Thus, what was said of unconscionability (a statutory standard for testing
the validity of a partition or exchange) 10 2 is irrelevant to such an agreement,
and what is said of the burden of proof for a determination that a partition is
unenforceable is accurate but beside the point. With respect to the argument
that such an agreement negates the community rights of reimbursement for
the husband's time and effort in benefiting his separate estate, the court
properly concluded that there was no evidence that the husband's separate
estate should be relieved of a reimbursement claim. The parties may have
intended to achieve that result but, if so, they should have so provided.
R Rebutting the Community Presumption
The Scott decision also offers some examples of the common difficulties in
using the tracing doctrine to overcome the community presumption. 0 3
Tracing the proceeds of the sale of separate realty and the trade-value of
separate personalty into purchases made during marriage demonstrates a
partial separate interest in the items purchased. 1 4 The even more elemen-
tary mode of identifying separate property by showing premarital acquisition
is illustrated by Parnell v. Parnell.10 5
When a transfer of property is made to a spouse during marriage, rebuttal
of its community character is difficult because the burden of proof is upon
the recipient-spouse to show that the acquisition was lucrative. The burden
is increased when the instrument of transfer contains a recital of valuable
100. TEX. CONST. art. XVI § 15:
Persons about to marry and spouses, without the intention to defraud pre-ex-
isting creditors, may by written instrument from time to time partition between
themselves all or part of their property, then existing or to be acquired, or ex-
change between themselves the community interest of one spouse or future
spouse in any property for the community interest of the other spouse or future
spouse in other community property then existing or to be acquired ...
Complementary statutory provisions are TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.43, 5.52 (Vernon Supp.
1992).
101. TEX. CONST. art XVI § 15:
spouses also may from time to time, by written instrument, agree between them-
selves that the income or property from all or part of the separate property then
owned or which thereafter might be acquired by one of them, shall be the sepa-
rate property of that spouse.
The word "only" was added in 1987 to make it clear that "one" did not mean "both." Its
complementary provision is TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.53 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
102. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
103. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon Supp. 1992). In In re Canon, 130 B.R.
748, 752 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991), an income tax refund received during marriage was pre-
sumed to be community property and no evidence was introduced to rebut the presumption.
104. Scott, 805 S.W.2d at 837-39.
105. 811 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
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consideration. In KB. v. N.B. 06 the husband's wholly owned corporation
made a conveyance to the husband of realty owned by the corporation before
his marriage. There was a recital of consideration and a conflict of evidence
as to whether any consideration was paid. The jury nevertheless found
against the husband's assertion that the property was his separate estate.
The community presumption therefore prevailed. 10 7
Pemelton v. Pemelton 108 presented a somewhat more difficult set of facts.
During marriage the wife's parents conveyed realty to her. In accepting the
wife's ten promissory notes for the land, the parents made no agreement to
look to the wife's separate estate to discharge them. As each note came due,
the parents forgave payment. It is not difficult to imagine that the parents'
pretransfer intention was in some measure donative, but the structure of the
transaction along with the grantors' apparent initial unwillingness to part
with the entire property defeated their presumed objective. 109 If they had
contracted to look only to the daughter's separate property for payment or
had taken non-recourse notes, their objective should have succeeded. 110
C. Retirement Benefits
Even before McCarty v. McCarty, I some federal statutes allowed the di-
vision of federal pension rights by state courts as community property." 12
For most purposes of characterization Texas courts 1 3 and those of the fed-
eral Fifth Circuit court of appeals' 14 have found that the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 115 does not preempt the field re-
lating to the pensions it regulates. Thus, Texas matrimonial property law
applies to pension interests in most instances. 1 6 The federal Ninth Circuit
court of appeals, however, has recently ruled that ERISA preempts Califor-
nia law so that the estate of the non-pensioner spouse who predeceases the
pensioner spouse has no community interest in the pensioner's pension inter-
est. 117 The result is directly contrary to Texas law. "18
106. 811 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
107. Id. at 642.
108. 809 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ granted).
109. Id. at 647-48.
110. See Scott, 805 S.W.2d at 837, and Jones v. Jones, 804 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1991, n.w.h.), in which instances of interspousal gift are resolved as fact questions.
The gift to both spouses in Jones produced common ownership by each spouse as separate
property.
111. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
112. See 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1) (1988) (for federal Civil Service retirement benefits enacted
in 1978); Naydan v. Naydan, 800 S.W.2d 637, 639-40 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
113. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 415, 432 (1991). See, e.g., Arena v. Arena, 822 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, n.w.h.)
114. McKnight, supra note 113, at 432.
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
116. See J. Lee Baldwin, The Doctrine of Preemption as it Applies to ERISA and Commu-
nity Property Settlements, 54 TEX. B.J. 18 (1991): See also Robert D. McClure, Thou Shalt Not
Kill (Thy Spouse): A Recent Exception to the ERISA Preemption Doctrine, 29 J. FAM. L. 129
(1990).
117. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991).
118. Allard v. Frech, 754 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1988) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989), dis-
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D. Reimbursement
Some uncommon reimbursement questions are presented in Jones v.
Jones 19 which involved the division of property in a 1989 divorce. In 1983
the husband, joined by his wife, made a gratuitous conveyance of his sepa-
rate property to the husband's son by a prior marriage. The transfer was
made with an intent to defraud the husband's and wife's creditors, but since
it was the husband's separate property that was transferred, the property
was not subject to division in their later divorce. 120 Before the transfer,
community property was used to improve the land, and after the transfer the
community discharged mortgage liability on the property and also continued
to receive the rents from the property. As to the community expenditures
for improvements, the court observed that a community right of reimburse-
ment was not recoverable because the property was "disposed of during the
marriage."' 121 It is hard to understand this observation unless the court
meant that the community right of reimbursement could not be asserted by
the wife because of her participation in the fraudulent transfer of the prop-
erty. If she had not participated in the transfer, the right of reimbursement
would not be lost. If a community benefit were rendered to the property
after its transfer, the use of community funds for the benefit of property of a
third person might be asserted as a constructive fraud 122 with a consequent
right of reimbursement 2 3 but for the effect of the wife's participation in the
initial transfer to the third person and the subsequent community enjoyment
of the rents from the property. It is implied in Pemelton v. Pemelton 124 that
the jury fixed the award of reimbursement and that implication is more
clearly indicated in Pearce v. Pearce.125 The issue of the enhancement of a
particular marital estate by another is factual, but the jury's function does
not go beyond that of fact-finding in the process of determining reimburse-
ment. It is not appropriate for the jury to make a balancing of benefits as
between the marital estates. That determination requires a weighing of equi-
cussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 1, 11 (1990).
119. 804 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, n.w.h.).
120. Id. at 624 (parcel no. 2, a lot and a duplex). If the property had been community
property, it would not have been recoverable for division because of the wife's participation in
the fraudulent transfer. Id. at 625 (parcel no. 4, a vacant lot). The court's reliance on Lechter
v. Lechter, 421 S.W.2d 162, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, writ dism'd), however, is
misplaced. That was a case of an alleged fraudulent transfer by the husband to his wife. On its
facts, the conclusion in Lechter is contrary to that in Rivera v. White, 94 Tex. 538, 63 S.W. 125
(1901). But even in the case of a truly fraudulent transfer by one spouse to the other, some
different considerations may be presented from those arising from a transfer by a spouse to a
third person. See Joseph W. McKnight, Liability of Separate and Community Property for
Obligations of Spouses to Strangers, in CREDITOR'S RIGHTS IN TEXAS (1st ed. by J. McKnight)
332, 353-56 (1963).
121. 804 S.W.2d at 626.
122. See Raulston v. Raulston, 531 S.W.2d 683, 684-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975,
no writ).
123. See Joseph W. McKnight, Toward a General Theory of Reimbursement, 1991 S.M.U.
TEXAS FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY SEMINAR I, at 1-2, 1-5 (1991).
124. 809 S.W.2d at 651.
125. 1991 WL 250884 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, n.w.h.).
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ties and an exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge. 126 In a di-
vorce case the judge must also determine the ultimate award of
reimbursement in making the division of community property between the
spouses.
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. Constructive Fraud
In Stevenson v. Koutzarov 127 the husband alleged that his wife and two of
her friends defrauded the community estate by conversion of assets, but the
facts were so sparse that the nature of the claim was not explained.1 28 In
Massey v. Massey,129 on the other hand, the wife asserted that her husband
had committed constructive fraud in disposing of community assets, failing
to account for community assets, encumbering them, and incurring liabilities
that would deplete them. Some of the amounts alleged were considerable,
and the community estate was apparently insolvent at divorce. The husband
made no attempt to meet "his burden to establish the fairness of the transac-
tions questioned."' 30 The trial court apparently submitted all the issues of
the "fairness" of the husband's dealings to the jury, and the jury answered
that constructive fraud had been committed and apparently made a further
finding as to amount.' 3' The propriety of submitting these issues to the jury
is subject to grave doubt. Even if the jury verdict is treated as merely advi-
sory, these matters require judicial determination.
Putnam Pension Plan v. Stephenson 132 is the first appellate case in which
one spouse has utilized the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act 133 against the other spouse. In her suit for divorce, the wife sought to
set aside a conveyance of community land subject to her husband's sole man-
agement as a fraudulent transfer. She utilized the Act to allege that the
recipient of the transfer was an "insider" in order to bring her case within
the bounds of actual fraud as statutorily defined, thereby avoiding the stric-
tures of constructive fraud. The husband was a co-investor in realty, on
behalf of the family, with the family physician. In financial difficulty, the
husband borrowed money from the doctor's pension trust and gave a lien on
part of the interest in the property. As the husband's financial difficulties
increased and after the wife sued for divorce, the husband gave the pension
126. In her dissent in Magill v. Magill, 816 S.W. 2d 530, 537 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.), Justice Dunn stressed that establishing a right of reimbursement is now
regarded as requiring more in the way of proof than assertion of a claim. Id. But when the
community estate asserts a right of reimbursement for improvements to a separate homestead
and expenses paid therefor, the burden of proof of offsetting benefits for the community is upon
the separate property owner.
127. 795 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
128. Id. at 320, 322-23.
129. 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
130. Id. at 403. See Lewis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse that Dissipates Property Available
for Equitable Property Distribution: A Suggested Analysis, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 95 (1991).
131. 807 S.W.2d at 402.
132. 805 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.).
133. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-.013 (Vernon 1987).
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trust a further lien for an additional loan. Finally, the husband conveyed his
interest in the land to the pension trust to satisfy these debts. The wife
joined the trust as a party in her suit for divorce and asserted that the trans-
fer was fraudulent because it was concealed and made while the transferor
was insolvent. The court held that the physician as administrator of the
trust was an "insider" within the terms of the Act.134 A transfer to an in-
sider is voidable without proof of actual intent to defraud or inadequacy of
consideration. The transfer was set aside and the property was awarded to
the wife by the divorce court. The transferee, without security, was left to
look to the ex-husband for repayment. 135
B. Liability
If both spouses incur joint liability for either contractual or tortious acts
and wish to seek a discharge of those obligations in bankruptcy, they will
ordinarily file jointly under section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 136 As a
general rule, however, an initial filing by only one spouse cannot later be
changed to a joint filing by merely adding the other spouse as a petitioner. 37
A creditor, however, has been allowed to join a non-filing spouse as a
party 138 in order to anticipate a future assertion by the non-filing spouse 139
that future acquisitions of jointly managed community property"O are not
subject to satisfaction of a "community claim" against the non-filing spouse.
Section 524(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code' 41 provides that an objection
to such an argument can be sustained if the non-filing spouse would not have
been entitled to a discharge in a Chapter 7 case on the date on which the
debtor-spouse's petition was filed. Thus, if the non-filing spouse is jointly
liable on a note with the petitioning debtor-spouse and the creditor suspects
that there are grounds for which the non-filing spouse would be denied a
discharge on the note, the creditor should seek an adjudication in the peti-
tioning creditor's bankruptcy if he foresees seeking satisfaction of a commu-
nity claim against future acquisitions of jointly managed community
property. If a non-filing innocent spouse is jointly liable on a community
claim asserted against the debtor spouse, the separate property and solely
managed community property of the non-filing spouse are still liable' 42.
134. 805 S.W.2d at 19. See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(7) (Vernon 1987)
(defining "insider").
135. The court was in error in saying that the transferee could seek payment from both the
ex-husband and the ex-wife. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
137. In re Matthews, 5 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 443 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
138. In re Braziel, 127 B.R. 156 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (1988).
140. Id. § 541(a)(2)(A).
141. Id. § 524(b)(2)(A). Under § 524(b)(2)(B) the non-filing spouse's creditor seems to be
precluded from later asserting the provisions of § 524(b)(2) if the non-joining spouse seeks the
protection of § 524(a)(3) in response to the creditor's attempt to seize a future acquisition of
community property for satisfaction of the non-filing spouse's obligation.
142. The protection of I U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) is limited to the kinds of property specified in
§ 541(a)(2), which includes community property subject to the petitioning spouse's sole or
joint management.
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C. Homestead: Designation and Extent
Since the generous redefinition of the urban homestead in terms of area
rather than very limited value in 1983, the similarities of the urban and rural
homesteads are far more marked. As before, each serves two primary pur-
poses: a place to live and a place to provide support for the family or the
single claimant. In the past the rural homestead (beyond that considered
part of the residence) had to be shown to be used for the support of the
family or the homestead claimant, 14 3 and the residence itself of an urban
worker could be rural. 144 Recently, there have been efforts to define these
limits more precisely. In Bradley v. Pacific Southwest Bank, 145 for example,
a bankruptcy court set aside as a rural homestead fifteen acres at the center
of a tract of 129.5 acres near Roanoke in Tarrant County. The fifteen acres
included the home and its outbuildings. The rest (114.5 acres comprised of
17 acres of hay meadow and 97.5 acres used for grazing) was excluded be-
cause the debtor and her husband had tried vigorously (but unsuccessfully)
to develop that part of the property for residential or commercial purposes
and on numerous occasions had denied that it was part of their homestead.
The excluded acreage had been productive of losses for tax purposes but
only marginally productive of income. The positive and negative evidence of
its appropriation to homestead use was, therefore, fairly evenly balanced.
On appeal from the bankruptcy court, the district court did not find the
conclusion to exclude the 129.5 acres from the homestead was not clearly
erroneous. Although it was not argued in Bradley that the area surrounding
the residence did not constitute a rural homestead because of its non-use for
economic support, that argument has been asserted on several other occa-
sions, 146 most recently in In re Mitchell. 147 There, the debtor's principal
occupation was the practice of law, and he maintained an office in his family
home located on 104 acres in a rural setting beyond the town of Bastrop.
Although he had engaged in some farming and ranching there, those en-
deavors do not appear to have been productive of net income and had been
abandoned. The court concluded, however, that the debtor's home and the
entire area surrounding it constituted his rural homestead and that no proof
is required that the property support the claimant or his family economi-
cally.' 48 The implication of the court's decision is that such a finding might
extend to an entire 200 acres. Thus, the business aspect of the rural home-
143. See Autry v. Reasor, 102 Tex. 123, 126-27, 108 S.W. 1162, 1164 (1908); Brooks v.
Chatham, 57 Tex. 31, 33 (1882); Lasseter v. Blackwell, 227 S.W. 944, 944 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1921, judgm't adopted).
144. Posey v. Bass, 77 Tex. 512, 514, 14 S.W. 156, 157 (1890); Lasseter v. Blackwell, 227
S.W. at 944.
145. 121 B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
146. See In re Spencer, 109 B.R. 715, 717 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Moellendorf, 3
Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 255 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Harrison, No. 390-34092 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1990), cited in In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 553, 555 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991); In re
Revira, No. 390-35358 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990), cited in Mitchell, 132 B.R. at 555.
147. 132 B.R. 553 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
148. Id. at 568.
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stead may be totally subsumed in its residential character, just as the urban
homestead of one acre may be totally devoted to a residence and its grounds.
Whether a homestead is rural or urban is a question of fact. 149 Thus, if
the property is rural when the homestead is established, it continues as such
until the region in which it is situated becomes a village or an adjacent town
engulfs it. 150 Even if those changes should occur, the legislature provided in
1989 that the homestead would not be classified as urban until "served by
municipal utilities and fire and police protection."''5 In United States v.
Blakeman 152 an order of the probate court had already limited the home-
stead right of a surviving widow to 100 acres as a "single, adult person"'153
before the widow sought the protection of the bankruptcy court. Unless
agreed by the widow and the adverse claimants, the probate court's unduly
restrictive order was based on a misconstruction of the statute which pro-
vides for a homestead of 100 acres, with improvements thereon, "for a single
adult person [who is] not otherwise entitled to a homestead."1 54 A widow or
widower, however, is otherwise entitled to a homestead as a surviving family
constituent' 55 and is therefore entitled to a rural homestead of 200 acres.
The status of a childless divorced spouse not providing a home for any
other dependent is different. In that case the former spouse can claim a
homestead only as a single adult but not as a family member.' 5 6 If the di-
vorced spouse is, or was, part of a family with a dependent during the mar-
riage, and the dependent remains in the family home after the divorce, the
homestead does not lose its family character. 57
It is not uncommon for a divorce court to grant homestead occupancy to
an ex-spouse until the youngest child of the marriage attains majority. As
between the ex-spouses, the right of exclusive occupancy of the homestead
premises thereupon ceases. As to the creditors of the ex-spouse who no
longer maintains a homestead right, 158 that ex-spouse's property is subject to
149. See Jones v. First Nat'l Bank of McAllen, 259 S.W. 157, 159 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1924, judgm't adopted); Vistron Corp. v. Winstead, 521 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1975, no writ).
150. See Lauchheimer & Sons v. Saunders, 97 Tex. 137, 140-41, 39 S.W. 750, 751 (1903).
151. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992). To say that this phrase
provides the only test for the difference between an urban and a rural homestead would be
grossly inaccurate. The third from last sentence in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law.- Hus-
band and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 415, 426 (1991) is incomplete. The
sentence should read: "Thus, if property is rural when the homestead is established, it contin-
ues as a rural homestead until served by municipal utilities and fire and police protection even
if the characteristics of the area are otherwise urban."
152. 750 F. Supp. 216, 221 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
153. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
154. Id. A similar error was made in Hunter v. Clark, 687 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1985, no writ).
155. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52.
156. Zapp v. Strohmeyer, 75 Tex. 638, 639, 13 S.W. 9, 10 (1890). See Joseph W. Mc-
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 97, 125
(1982).
157. The family need not consist of a parent and minor child, though that is the most
common instance. See Henry S. Miller Co. v. Shoaf, 434 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (former spouse and her mother).
158. The homestead right of the non-occupant is not necessarily lost, but may be merely
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seizure. In First Huntsville Properties Co. v. Laster 159 the court awarded the
community home to the ex-spouses in unequal, undivided shares, but al-
lowed the ex-wife occupancy until their youngest child attained the age of
eighteen. The ex-husband later gave a mortgage on his share. He defaulted
on his note and the lender foreclosed the mortgage and bought his interest
which was later sold to another purchaser. After the ex-spouses' younger
child attained eighteen, the purchaser sought a partition of the property.
The ex-wife's resistance was to no avail. "[O]ne's homestead right in prop-
erty [owned by cotenants] can never rise any higher than the right, title, or
interest that [the owner has] in the property attempted to be impressed with
a homestead right."' 16 Unlike the widow in United States v. Blakeman,'6 1
the ex-wife would not be entitled to compensation for her loss of the value of
homestead occupancy subsequent to the time provided in the divorce decree
because her loss was a consequence of her status as a cotenant. It is an open
question whether a purchaser of the husband's interest with notice of the ex-
wife's right of occupancy could have a partition resulting in the ex-wife's
dispossession prior to the adulthood of the youngest child as provided in the
decree. 162
The business homestead is the urban counterpart of the larger rural area
allowed for the support of a family or a single claimant. In two recent cases
a business homestead exemption was asserted by a claimant pursuing his
livelihood through an independent business entity. In In re Cooper 163 the
court concluded that because the property was owned by a partnership in
which the debtor held a half interest and was rented to a professional corpo-
ration of which the debtor was the sole owner, the ownership interest con-
trolled the results. Because the debtor did not own the property, the
exemption claim was unsuccessfully asserted. 164 As a secondary ground for
its holding, the court said that rental of the property during the entire period
of ownership also constituted a bar to the exemption claim because rental
property which is merely productive of income cannot be a business home-
stead.' 65 In In re John Taylor Company 166 the Fifth Circuit court of appeals
also stated that in such situations the exemption should be denied 167 but
held that an ownership interest in property rented to a debtor's business
suspended if the non-occupant does not acquire another homestead. See Speer & Goodnight v.
Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 454-55, 119 S.W. 86, 88 (1909).
159. 797 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1990), aff'd, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
229 (Dec. 14, 1992).
160. Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 64, 161 S.W.2d 769, 773 (1942).
161. 750 F. Supp. 216, 222 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
162. Cf Villarreal v. Laredo National Bank, 677 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (entire property awarded to husband subject to wife's right to occu-
pancy and husband renewed lien unilaterally).
163. 128 B.R. 632 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
164. Id. at 636.
165. Id. at 636-37 (citing Texas Commerce Bank-Irving v. McCreary, 677 S.W.2d 643,
645 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ); Yates v. Home Building & Loan Co., 103 S.W.2d
1081, 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ)).
166. 935 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1991).




entity is exempt. The fundamental difference in John Taylor was that the
debtor himself owned the premises. Whether the property had been used as
the debtor's business homestead before it was leased to his corporation was
not indicated. In concluding that the debtor was entitled to claim the prop-
erty as a business homestead, 168 the court relied on two Texas cases. One
was a case in which the debtor's property was rented to a partnership of
which the debtor was a member with the creditor. ' 69 Although the partner-
ship was there referred to as an entity, under the applicable law of the
time170 a partnership was not an entity but merely an aggregate of personal
interests and each partner therefore maintained at least a one-half interest in
the lease. In the other case relied on,171 the debtor's building was used at
times by a family corporation to conduct its business and the name of the
corporation was placed on the building, but "[the debtor] continued to oper-
ate his business individually in the buildings on the lots in question.' 72
Both of these authorities are singularly unsupportive of the court's holding
that the debtor who leased (and therefore gave exclusive possession of his
property to a corporate entity) used the premises as his business homestead.
The court also noted in John Taylor ' 73 that the debtor was limited to the
extent of the homestead exemption in effect in 1979, when the original peti-
tion in bankruptcy was filed, rather than the exemption as redefined in 1983.
Although the language of the 1983 homestead amendment to the Texas Con-
stitution 74 has been misconstrued to indicate intended retrospective ef-
fect, 175 the court stated here that, however interpreted, the Texas
constitutional amendment of 1983 might change pre-bankruptcy rights but
could not affect post-bankruptcy rights as determined by federal law. 176
Following John Taylor, the same point was made in In re Canion. 177
If a homestead is sold, the proceeds are exempt for six months178 so that
the homestead owner will have an opportunity to reinvest the proceeds in
another homestead. In In re Evans 179 the court concluded that once part of
the proceeds is reinvested in another homestead, the remainder is no longer
exempt during the six-months' period.
Once designation of a homestead is established, the burden of proof is
168. Id.
169. Inman v. Inman, 80 S.W.2d 1103, 1105 (Tex. Civ App.-El Paso 1935, no writ).
170. See Byron D. Sher & Alan R. Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the Twentieth
Century--Why Texas Should Adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 Sw. L.J. 263, 264-69
(1958). See also McSwain, The Current Status of the Texas Business Homestead, 29 STATE
BAR NEWSLETTER, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW 29, 30 (No. 3, April 1991).
171. Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Miller, 240 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1951, no writ).
172. Id.
173. 935 F.2d at 78.
174. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
175. See McKnight, supra note 15 at 30-31.
176. 935 F.2d at 78.
177. 5 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 438 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
178. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41,001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
179. 135 B.R. 261, 264 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
1850 [Vol. 45
FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
upon the contestant to show that it was abandoned.180 In Caulley v. Caul-
ley 1'8 the husband and wife had made their urban home in the wife's sepa-
rate property since their marriage in 1981. In 1983 the couple purchased a
farm of 150 acres in the same county. The farm appears to have been com-
munity property subject to their joint management. In 1987 a judgment was
taken against the husband and an abstract of judgment was filed in the
county of his residence. Although it is not indicated whether the husband
acted with his wife's consent, he then filed a declaration that the rural prop-
erty was his homestead, and within a few days the wife sought to declare
that the urban residence was not a homestead. The couple nevertheless con-
tinued to spend the majority of their time in the urban house, and the trial
court ruled that the couple had not effectively abandoned their urban home-
stead. The appellate courts found adequate evidence to support that
conclusion. 18 2
In In re Bowyer18 3 the Fifth Circuit court of appeals reconsidered what
may be done in the way of "legitimate prebankruptcy planning."' 84 In July
and August of 1987 the debtor and his wife used savings of $25,000 to make
an unscheduled payment on a home mortgage and the debtor used $7,000
more to install central heating and air conditioning in the home. The bank-
ruptcy court found that the debtor did not, at that time, have plans to file for
bankruptcy. About fifteen days before filing for bankruptcy in October, the
debtor's wife applied another $24,000 from savings to payment of the home
mortgage. A divided panel of the court'8 5 affirmed the holding of the bank-
ruptcy and district courts that these transfers were not grounds for denial of
the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy.18 6 The crucial distinction between
these facts and those in In re Reed 18 7 was that in Reed the debtor intended
to defraud his creditors, in addition to other more egregious acts in raising
non-exempt funds to invest in exempt property.' 88 In effect, the court
treated the phrase "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor"' 8 9 as a
unit and did not focus on the words "hinder [or] delay" as constituting a
separate ground for denial of a discharge. 19°
A voluntary, but fraudulently intentioned, conveyance of homestead prop-
180. Caulley v. Caulley, 806 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. 1991); Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d
39, 43 (Tex. 1971); Exocet, Inc. v. Cordes, 815 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991,
n.w.h.).
181. 806 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1991).
182. Id. at 797.
183. 932 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991).
184. Id. at 1103.
185. Wisdom and David, Circuit Judges; Barksdale, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
186. 932 F.2d at 1102; 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1988). In In re Swift, a bankruptcy
judge commented on a creditor's attack on a debtor's right to a discharge couched in terms of
an unproved objection to exemptions under TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.004(a). 124 BR.
475, 481-83 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
187. 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
188. 932 F.2d at 1102. See Joseph W. McKnight, Prefiling Exemption Planning: A Na-
tional Perspective in 2 JOSEPH NORTON, MICHAEL ROCHELLE, PETER FRANKLIN, REPRE-
SENTING DEBTORS IN BANKRUPTCY 3.02 (1988).
189. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1988).
190. Barksdale, Circuit Judge, dissented on this point. 932 F.2d at 1103.
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erty prior to bankruptcy bars an assertion of its exempt status if it is re-
trieved by the bankruptcy trustee. 19 In In re Sherk 192 a couple's home had
been lost by foreclosure of a purchase-money lien in 1987. A loan company
then purchased the property from the foreclosing creditor and leased it to
the couple with an option to purchase. When the couple defaulted on their
lease and failed to exercise their option to purchase, the loan company
evicted the couple by a judicial proceeding. In his bankruptcy the husband
asserted that the property was his homestead 93 and his wife joined in their
claim. The court said that assertion of a homestead in property that has
been foreclosed and sold is without basis. ' 94 Had the assertion not accompa-
nied other arguments related to the bankruptcy pleadings, the claim would
have been frivolous.
D. Liens on Homesteads
Under the Texas Constitution' 95 a valid lien may be put on a homestead
for purchase money, improvements, and property taxes. In the case of an
improvement lien, the contract must comply with certain statutory require-
ments as well. 196 In Exocet, Inc. v. Cordes 197 the court considered whether
a lien attaches to a homestead when a creditor abstracts a judgment against
the owner. Although the Texas Constitution states that, except for one of
the purposes specified, "no . . . other lien on the homestead shall ever be
valid," 98 the Property Code provides when an abstract of judgment is re-
corded and indexed in accordance with statutory requirements, it "consti-
tutes a lien on the real property of the defendant located in the county."' 99
Because homestead property is not statutorily excepted from the operation
of this provision, the court held that a judgment lien fixes on homestead
property, but the property is exempted from enforcement of the perfected
lien. 200 This analysis is untenable constitutionally 20 1 and precedentially. 20 2
The judgement lien does not attach. It is not merely unenforceable. Since
the lien appears to attach and one who merely searches the record does not
know whether specific property is a homestead, judicial action is necessary
to remove the cloud from the owner's title. No specific simple means of
achieving this result is provided by statute. After expiration of a year fol-
191. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 550. See McKnight, supra note 188, 3.03. For a case involving a
prepetition voluntary transfer of exempt personalty, see In re Crozier, 132 B.R. 224 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1991).
192. 918 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1990).
193. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 550.
194. 918 F.2d at 1176.
195. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
196. In re Burnett, 120 B.R. 839, 841-42 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
197. 815 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, n.w.h.).
198. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
199. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
200. 815 S.W.2d at 352. See also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
201. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
202. See Harms v. Ehlers, 179 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1944, writ ref'd.)
(ruling that the homestead character of property precludes the attachment of a judgement lien
to the property).
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lowing a homestead claimant's bankruptcy, however, a statutory means is
provided for expunging a void lien against the homestead. 20 3 A statutory
means of removing the lien should be provided for the non-bankruptcy
situation.
One of the most difficult areas of homestead law is that involving repre-
sentations of the claimant with respect to homestead, or non-homestead,
character of property in the course of procuring a loan. In D'Oench, Duhme
& Company v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. 204 the United States Supreme
Court held that secret agreements made by a failed bank with a borrower
could not be relied on by the borrower when a federal agency such as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) undertakes to enforce the
loan agreement against the borrower.20 5 In Patterson v. Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation206 the borrower gave a lien on land as collateral for a
loan and represented in the loan agreement that the land did not constitute
her homestead. After the lender-bank failed and the borrower defaulted, the
FDIC brought suit to foreclose the lien and moved to preclude the defendant
from offering any evidence that the land was her homestead. The defendant
argued that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine merely precluded the assertion of
an agreement contradicting the loan agreement and did not prejudice her
reliance on Texas homestead law. The district court nevertheless granted
the plaintiff's motion. The Fifth Circuit court of appeals held that the trial
court properly excluded any evidence of an alleged oral agreement on the
part of bank officers in connection with the homestead exemption20 7 but that
the lower court had improperly excluded evidence of the borrower's home-
stead rights under Texas law.208 The court went on to say that, although the
FDIC as a holder in due course could ward off personal defenses of the
borrower, it was not protected from the assertion of a real defense to liability
such as that afforded by the Texas homestead law.2°9 In response to the
FDIC's argument that the borrower was estopped from asserting her home-
stead by her denial that it was such in the loan agreement, the court said that
203. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.022 (Vernon 1984).
204. 315 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1942).
205. The D'Oench, Duhme holding is codified in slightly modified form as 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) (1988):
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] in
any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security for a loan or by
purchase, shall be valid against the [FDIC] unless such agreement
(1) shall be in writing,
(2) shall be executed by the bank and any person claiming an ad-
verse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporane-
ously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank,
(3) shall have been approved by the board of directors of the bank
or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the
minutes of said board or committee, and
(4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution,
an official record of the bank.
206. 918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990).
207. Id. at 543.
208. Id. (citing In re Howard, 65 B.R. 498, 503 (W.D. Tex 1986)).
209. Id. at 544.
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"Texas law is clear that a homestead claimant is not estopped to assert his
homestead rights in property on the basis of declarations made to the con-
trary if, at the time of the declarations, the claimant was in actual use and
possession of the property. '210
First Interstate Bank of Bedford v. Bland 211 illustrates this rule. There,
the homestead claimant agreed to guarantee a loan which his son sought
from a bank. The claimant executed a deed of trust on the homestead prop-
erty in which he denied that the property was his homestead. The son repre-
sented to the bank that the property was his weekend house. In the
claimant's suit to preclude foreclosure, the court held that the claimant was
not bound by his false representation. 21 2 The claimant had only one home,
and he resided there. No estoppel principle could operate against the claim-
ant in this situation.
Texas debtors ordinarily choose the Texas homestead exemption in bank-
ruptcy. If they prefer, however, they may choose the federal homestead ex-
emption of $7,500.213 Thus, if both spouses file for bankruptcy jointly, they
are entitled to a combined homestead exemption of $15,000.214 Under sec-
tion 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code215 debtors are entitled to avoid any judi-
cial lien impairing their claimed homestead exemption. Under this power
the debtor in In re Inman 216 sought to avoid a conveyance of his homestead
which he had made in satisfaction of an agreed judgment in favor of his
creditor. The issue was whether the transfer consitututed "a judicial lien"
within section 522(f). The court held that the conveyance could not be in-
terpreted as a lien.21 7 A grant of a lien on a homestead to satisfy a judgment
is void under Texas law,21 8 but a conveyance of the homestead is valid to
discharge a debt.
In Farrey v. Sanderfoot219 the United States Supreme Court dealt with a
fundamental point in the interpretation of section 522(f). In dividing the
spouse's joint tenancy homestead, the Wisconsin divorce court awarded the
home to the husband, ordered him to pay his wife her interest in it, and put a
lien on the home for the amount of that money-judgment. The husband
thereupon filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and sought the applica-
tion of section 522(f) to "avoid the fixing of a lien" on his property. The
petitioner's full fee interest in the exempt property was indeed impaired by a
judicial lien, but probably not the sort of judicial lien the drafters of section
522(f) had in mind. 220 Noting that the lien could not fix on the debtor's
210. In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 808 (5th Cir. 1987), quoted in Patterson at 546-47.
211. 810 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, n.w.h.).
212. Id. at 286-87.
213. 11 U.S.C § 522(d)(1) (1988).
214. In re Truan, 121 B.R. 9, 10 (Bankr. S.D. Tex 1990).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
216. 5 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 197 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
217. Id. at 199.
218. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
219. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
220. For a discussion of this and the more common type of judicial lien, see Day v. Day,
610 S.W.2d 195, 197-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). An ordinary judicial
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property until the property was actually his, the Court reasoned that if the
lien fixed before or simultaneously with the debtor's acquition of the prop-
erty, the lien did not fasten to the debtor's property after he acquired it.
Hence, because he owned an undivided half of the property during marriage,
he did not acquire the conceptually different entire interest in specific prop-
erty until the fee was awarded to him in the divorce decree.221 It might have
been more to the point to say that the divorce court's fixing the lien on the
property was a merely formal act in the division of marital property, and
because it did not diminish the husband's interest in the property, its effect
was nugatory. If this had been a Texas decree dividing a community home-
stead, the lien could be interpreted as a purchase money mortgage222 and
therefore clearly not avoidable under section 522(f) but for the fact that the
lien was fixed judicially. 223 In In re Finch 224 the rationale of Farrey was
literally applied to a Texas case with similar facts, but the court had some
anxious moments in fitting Texas law into the Farrey analysis. 225
Owen v. Owen 226 was decided by the United States Supreme Court on the
same day as Farrey. The dispute in Owen arose out of a Florida judgment
lien fixed on the condominium of an ex-husband after his ex-wife was
awarded and recorded a post-divorce money-judgment against him. It was
not until after an abstract of judgment lien fixed on the property, however,
that Florida law was amended so that the condominium could be claimed as
a homestead. After filing for bankruptcy, the husband moved for avoidance
of the judicial lien under section 522(f). The Court held that the judicial lien
could be eliminated, even though Florida law had construed the homestead
exemption as not extending to that part of the property encumbered by a lien
before the homestead interest arose. 227 The Court's conclusion was based on
the premise that section 522(f) allows the debtor to avoid any "lien im-
pair[ing] an exemption to which [the debtor] would have been entitled but for
the lien itself"'228
E. Exempt Personalty
A lien for purchase-money on personal property cannot be set aside under
lien arising from the abstract of judgment of an ex-spouse-creditor was at issue in the compan-
ion case, Owen v. Owen, ll S. Ct. 1833 (1991). See also In re Swift, 124 B.R. 475, 486-87
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
221. Conceptually this analysis does not square with the traditional notion of a joint ten-
ancy under old English law (though perhaps it is consistent with Wisconsin law), because at
common law both tenants held per mi et per tout. Hence, each held all of the property during
the marriage as well as an undivided one-half. This may be a trifle too metaphysical for most
tastes, but the analysis of the Court may suffer from the same complaint.
222. See In re Worth, 100 B.R. 834 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989), commented on in McKnight,
supra note 113, at 429-30.
223. See Swift, 124 B.R. at 487 (citing Lettieri v. Lettieri, 654 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
224. 130 B.R. 753 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
225. Id. at 755-56.
226. 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991).
227. Id. at 1838.
228. Id. at 1836-37.
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section 522(f). 229 Two bankruptcy cases230, decided together, raised this
same issue in relation to contracts to purchase exempt household goods.
The court concluded that refinancing the purchase contracts did not destroy
the purchase-money nature of the contracts, and liens initially fixed by the
contracts were, therefore, not subject to avoidance under section 522(f). 231
The Court noted in Owen that section 522(f) has been applied unevenly
"to state exemptions", though the interpretation of federal exemptions has
uniformly rejected this approach.232 The Supreme Court cited In re Mc-
Manus 233 as a case of different interpretation in relation to state law.2 34
There, the Fifth Circuit court of appeals construed the Louisiana personal
property exemption statute as making only the unencumbered part of the
property exempt. Hence, there was no encumbrance on the exempt property
which would allow recourse to section 522(f). In In re Allen 235 the same
court followed McManus to give a similar construction to the Texas personal
property exemption statute.236 About six months before Owen was decided,
the Texas legislature reworded the Texas statute to overcome that construc-
tion, thereby conforming Texas law to the result reached in Owen. 237 The
draftsman's commentary stated that the language of section 42.001238 was
revised so that bankrupt Texans would be entitled to the benefits of section
522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Elsewhere the draftsman also indicated an
intent to correct the misinterpretation of the language of section 42.001239 so
that encumbered items of personal property are treated as wholly exempt,
though the unencumbered portion of their fair market value is used in com-
puting the increased aggregate limitation of $60,000 for a family and $30,000
for a single adult.
To conform the revised personal property exemption statute to the provi-
sions of the Texas Constitution,24° current wages are given unlimited exemp-
tion from seizure, but unpaid commissions are exempted in an amount not to
exceed one-fourth of the aggregate limitation amounts, that is, $15,000 for a
229. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
230. In re Palmer, In re Voyles, 123 B.R. 218 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
231. Id. at 221-22.
232. 111 S.Ct. at 1836.
233. 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982). Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting in Owen, stated
that the majority of the Court adopted the position of the dissenting judge in McManus. I 1l S.
Ct. at 1842.
234. 111 S. Ct. at 1836 n.l.
235. 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984), noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law. Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 131, 157 (1984); See also Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law; 41 Sw. L.J. 1, 27
(1987).
236. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
237. In In re Kelly, 133 B.R. 811, 813 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991), the court applied the rule
in Owen to personal property without noting the amendment of the statute.
238. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
239. The draftsman's commentary stated that the new language was meant to correct the
misinterpretation of the court in In re Barnett, 33 B.R. 70 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983). A sum-
mary of the draftsman's commentary appears in STATE BAR [OF TEXAS] SECTION REPORT,
FAMILY LAW 41 (Summer 1991).
240. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
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member of a family and $7,500 for a single adult.241 Professionally pre-
scribed health aids of a debtor or a dependent of a debtor were added to the
list of exemptions and put outside the limitation of value.242 The catalogue
of exempt personalty was somewhat simplified by restating categories in a
more generalized fashion. 243 With respect to wearing apparel, the draftsman
meant to simplify construction by adding a specific reference to jewelry (in
conformity to the great weight of authority) only to have that subsection
further complicated by a committee amendment limiting the jewelry exemp-
tion to one-fourth of the aggregate limitation.2" By specifying fair market
value as the standard for measuring value, future disputes are obviated, such
as that in In re Swift 245 on the value of a watch. In commenting on the
various classes of exempt personalty, the draftsman also pointed out that it
was intended that mention of a particular sort of personalty in one category
does not exclude a similar sort from qualifying in another category. For
example, a vehicle that does not fit within the definition of an exempt vehicle
within section 42.001(a)(3) 246 may nonetheless be claimed as a tool of trade
under section 42.001(a)(4).247
A continuing split of judicial authority has developed as courts attempt to
construe the tools-of-trade exemption. One view limits the exemption to
those things peculiarly adapted to a trade or business, as opposed to things
merely used in the business. Thus, in Swift248 the exemption was construed
as not covering all office furniture and equipment needed and used by an
insurance agent. The more liberal view, however, is that all items "fairly
belonging" to a business are exempt.249 It was nevertheless noted in In re
Hernandez,250 that a wrecked pickup truck is simply unusable as a tool of
trade and thus cannot qualify as exempt property.25I Furthermore, if the
debtor rents his tools to a wholly owned professional association and uses
them as an employee of the association, such tools are not exempt for the
debtor.252
The 1991 amendments to chapter 42 of the Property Code moderated the
standards for the exemption of the present value of a life insurance policy
within the aggregate limitation.253 The requirement that the policy be in
effect for two years is now omitted. Although meant to allow greater flexi-
bility in valuation, the substitution of "present value" for cash surrender
241. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992). This was a committee
amendment and was inadvertently inserted in § 42.001(d) rather than § 42.002 because exempt
commissions are within the limitation.
242. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
243. See, e.g., id. § 42.002(a)(10)(D) (domestic fowl).
244. TEX. PROP CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
245. 124 B.R. 475, 481 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
246. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
247. Id. § 42.001(a)(4).
248. 124 B.R. at 480-81.
249. Meritz v. Palmer, 266 F.2d 265, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1959).
250. 131 B.R. 61 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
251. Id. at 63.
252. In re Cooper, 128 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
253. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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value for life insurance policies may prove to be unwise. 25 4 The Insurance
Code was also amended during the same legislative session to give the "pol-
icy proceeds and cash values to be paid or rendered "on a policy of life,
health or accident insurance an unlimited exemption from seizure and "all
demands in any bankruptcy proceeding of the insured or beneficiary. '255
Thus, the broader provisions of the Insurance Code seem to make a debtor's
reliance on the Property Code unnecessary, and the beneficiary may be the
insured or the estate of the insured. The Insurance Code exemption appears
to protect proceeds from seizure whether still in the hands of the insurer or
after receipt by the beneficiary. In In re Hosek 256 the court relied on both
the prior and the amended provisions of the Insurance Code to conclude
that a claim for uninsured motorist benefits against the debtor-beneficiary's
own liability carrier is exempt from seizure. 25 7
In revising chapter 42 of the Property Code, the draftsman did not disturb
the provisions of section 42.0021258 enacted in 1987 in response to In re
Goff,25 9 in which the Fifth Circuit court of appeals held that ERISA did not
provide an exemption which Texas debtors in bankruptcy could elect in ad-
dition to their choice in favor of Texas exemptions. In In re Dyke 260 a two-
judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reiterated the conclusion reached in Goff261
and went on to hold that ERISA does not preempt section 42.0021 but in-
deed saves it from preemption.262 In In re Volpe, 263 decided by the same
panel, the court concluded that section 42.0021 as it stood before amend-
ment in 1989 might include more than one individual retirement account
(IRA) just as it was amended to specify. In In re Swift,264 however, a bank-
ruptcy court held, as the Fifth Circuit had indicated,265 that a Keogh ac-
count is not exempt under section 42.0021 if the account is not qualified
under the Internal Revenue Code266 as section 42.0021 requires. Further-
more, if such a Keogh account is transformed into an IRA, it is not exempt
because the Internal Revenue Code prohibits qualification to an IRA rolled
over from a unqualified plan. 267
An order under the turnover statute that a person should deliver wages as
received was seen by many as a means of circumventing the policy of the
constitutional rule against garnishment of wages in the hands of an employer
in that the wage earner had no opportunity to use the wages for the purchase
254. See In re Swift, 124 B.R. at 486.
255. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
256. 5 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 456 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (overruling a motion to recon-
sider 124 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991)).
257. Id. at 457-58.
258. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
259. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
260. 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991).
261. Id. at 1443.
262. Id. at 1449-50 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988)).
263. In re Volpe, 943 F.2d 1451 (5th Cir. 1991).
264. 124 B.R. 475 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
265. In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1440 n.13.
266. 124 BR. at 484.
267. Id. at 485.
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of necessaries before they were taken from him.268 In 1991 the legislature
enacted an amendment to the turnover statute whereby judicial orders were
precluded from requiring "the turnover of the proceeds of... property ex-
empt under any statute" with an exception for meeting child support obliga-
tions.269 Once received by the wage earner, however, wages are not exempt
property. 270 The Texas supreme court noted, however, that it was the intent
of the legislature in passing the 1991 amendment to exempt "paychecks"
from the operation of the turnover statute as well as retirement checks,
IRAs, and other such property exempt under the Bankruptcy Code. "By
prohibiting the turnover of the proceeds of property exempted under any
statute, this section necessarily prohibits the turnover of the proceeds of cur-
rent wages."'27' The case before the court was one in which an ex-wife with
a foreign alimony decree sought satisfaction from her ex-husband by way of
a turnover order granted by the lower courts. In reversing the order, the
Texas supreme court relied on the 1991 amendment to the turnover statute,
which by its terms was meant to have retrospective effect.272 In Rucker v.
Rucker,273 however, the Houston Fourteenth District court of appeals made
the further point that the burden of proof is upon the claimant to show that
particular property ordered to be turned over is exempt property. 274
IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
A. Reference to a Master
Reference of disputes to a statutory family court master has become rou-
tine in metropolitan areas over the past decade and in 1991 the title of this
master was changed to associate judge. 275 Elsewhere, referral of disputes to
a master under Rule 171 has become more common.276 In Martin v. Mar-
tin 277 a master in chancery was appointed to hear evidence and to make
findings of fact and recommendations. Objections were made to the master's
report, but no objection was made to the court's refusal to hear evidence,
though some evidence was ultimately heard. The trial court divided the
property on the basis of the findings of the master. On appeal to the Texar-
kana court of appeals the husband asserted that the property had been im-
properly divided, but because of the presumption in favor of the court's
proper exercise of its discretion, the appellant was unable to make any show-
ing from the record that the division was manifestly unfair. The husband's
268. The view had also been expressed that money on the person of a debtor was not
property subject to seizure. See Dwight Olds & Phillip I. Palmer, Jr., Property Exempt Prop-
erty, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAs 23, 58 (J. McKnight, ed. 1963).
269. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(f) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
270. Raborn v. Davis, 795 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1990)(per curiam).
271. Caulley v. Caulley, 806 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex. 1991) (emphasis by the court) (refer-
ring to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002 (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
272. Id. at 798 n.2.
273. 810 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
274. Id. at 795-96.
275. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 54.019 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
276. TEX. R. Civ. P. 171.
277. 797 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, n.w.h.).
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failure to object to the judge's refusal to hear evidence at the de novo hearing
on the objections to the master's report was fatal to the appeal.
In a mandamus proceeding before the Houston First District court of ap-
peals in a somewhat similar matter 278 the court stressed the importance of
the master's compliance with section 54.010 of the Government Code279 in
giving notice to all parties of the substance of the report and the right of
appeal to the judge. Only after the judge's ruling is made on the issues in
dispute can recourse be had to a higher court.280 The propriety of the initial
appointment of a master in chancery is within the trial court's discretion 281
and abuse of discretion may now be more difficult to show than it once was.
The Houston court also noted 282 that Rule 171 does not require a trial court
to set a hearing to review the report of a master. Once a report is filed,
however, and objections are made to it, the court should proceed as though
no reference to a master was made. The Texarkana court in Martin com-
mented that the master's report is not admissible in evidence 28 3 and the
master is not an appropriate witness at a de novo trial on his report.284 The
master's fee is properly fixed as costs of suit awarded in the discretion of the
trial court285 but should not include the time spent in making a written re-
port to a party's objection,286 because the master is thereby involved as an
adversary.
Once the master's report is submitted, a dissatisfied party's right to a de
novo trial is unimpaired. He may then request a jury trial, even though no
demand for a jury trial was previously made.287 Nor is the right to a new
trial affected by any failure to object to the initial referral to a master. 288
B. Interlocutory Orders
In Shankles v. Shankles289 the court held that a petition for divorce may
be filed before the petitioner's residence requirement 290 is met. Once the
period of residence is completed, the petition may be amended to show satis-
faction of this prerequisite to divorce. In Oak v. Oak 291 a petition for di-
vorce was filed prior to the petitioner having lived in Texas for six months,
though satisfaction of the residence requirement was alleged. The respon-
278. Waddell v. Huckabee, 807 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], orig. pro-
ceeding), approved sub nom. Waddell v. First Court of Appeals, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1991).
279. TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 54.010 (Vernon 1988).
280. 807 S.W.2d at 458.
281. See id. at 458-59.
282. Id. at 459.
283. 797 S.W.2d at 350.
284. Id. at 352.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Minnich v. Jones, 799 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, n.w.h.).
288. Vaughan v. Vaughan, 805 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied).
289. 445 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, no writ).
290. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975). See Liepelt v. Oliveira, 818 S.W.2d 75,
78 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.).
291. 814 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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dent, whose residence requirement was also unsatisfied, responded with a
general denial but did not attack the petitioner's lack of compliance with the
prescribed period of residence. A hearing was held about three weeks after
the filing of the petition, and the petitioner was temporarily restrained from
changing the beneficiary designation of any life insurance policy. More than
six months after the petitioner established his residence in Texas, a tempo-
rary injunction was issued to the same effect. In defiance of the order, the
petitioner nonetheless changed the beneficiary designation of a life insurance
policy but died before any further action was had in the divorce proceeding.
The probate court, in which the petitioner's estate was being administered,
held that the change of beneficiary designation was ineffective, and that con-
clusion was sustained on appeal. 292 The period of actual residence had cured
the factual insufficiency of the uncontested pleading of residence.
An interlocutory foreign order was before the court in Myers v. Ribble.293
The wife had filed suit in Texas to enforce a Florida decree providing for a
money-judgment against her husband. After the husband failed to respond,
the trial court issued an order of recognition of the foreign judgment.294 In
his appeal the husband showed that in making the decree the Florida court
had retained jurisdiction to determine attorney's fees and costs. The appel-
late court held that the Florida decree was therefore interlocutory and was
not subject to enforcement. 295
In Dancy v. Daggett 296 the divorce court refused to grant a second motion
for continuance filed by the respondent's attorney, who was engaged in an-
other hearing, and proceeded to conduct a temporary hearing in the absence
of the attorney. The respondent then filed a motion for rehearing and, on its
denial, sought a bill of review from the appellate court. Although the appel-
late court strongly disapproved the trial court's rulings, it felt that it lacked
the power to issue the writ of mandamus.297 The Texas supreme court dis-
agreed and granted the writ of mandamus to compel the divorce court to
continue the hearing.298 The court stated that the denial of the continuance
violated local rules and deprived the respondent of representation at the
hearing. 299
Ex parte Pryor300 involved a divorce proceeding in which the trial court
ordered the husband to deliver certain executed instruments to his wife and
on his failure to do so found him in contempt and committed him to jail.
The husband sought a writ of habeas corpus at the time his motion for a new
trial was pending. He asserted that the lack of a final order in the divorce
292. Id. at 838-39.
293. 796 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, n.w.h.).
294. Merely filing the foreign judgment with the clerk of a Texas court is required by TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 35.003 (a),(b) (Vernon 1986).
295. 796 S.W. at 224.
296. 809 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] orig. proceeding), overruled, 815
S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1991).
297. Id. at 630.
298. 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).
299. Id.
300. 800 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1990).
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proceeding was a bar to his commitment because the court could modify its
order within thirty days. The Texas supreme court said that there is no such
bar to the exercise of a trial court's inherent power to achieve obedience to
its order.30 1
C. Agreements Incident to Divorce
The provisions of Family Code section 3.631(a)30 2 encourage spouses to
enter into a written agreement for the division of their property on divorce
but protect either party by allowing repudiation prior to rendition of the
divorce. The fact that an agreement contains a provision for contractual
alimony makes the agreement no less enforceable. 30 3 If it is assumed that
such an agreement must be supported by consideration, adequate considera-
tion is found in the alimony recipient's acquiescence in the terms of the
agreement for property division.3°4 In Rogers v. Rogers30 5 the parties en-
tered into a written settlement agreement contingent on a satisfactory ar-
rangement of security for monthly payments to be made by the husband to
the wife after the divorce. Looking to the attorneys to prepare appropriate
documents, the court approved this agreement and granted the divorce. The
wife's attorney prepared a draft settlement agreement and the husband's at-
torney tendered what purported to be the appropriate guarantee of payment,
but the wife's counsel rejected the proposed guarantee as insufficient. The
court nevertheless entered judgment and later overruled the wife's motion
for a new trial. The wife's appeal was limited to the issue of insufficient
security and her failure to accede to it.36 The appellate court concluded
that the question of security was a material term in the agreement and that
failure of both parties to agree to it made the agreement incomplete and
unenforceable.3 0 7 The trial court, therefore, could not enter a final judgment
on the strength of a contingent agreement. 308
In Boyett v. Boyett,3°9 however, the ex-husband did not perceive his error
in agreeing to a term of the settlement until well after the decree had become
final and he was therefore bound by the agreement. In his suit for reforma-
tion the ex-husband was unable to show a mutual mistake. He asserted that
the agreement inadvertently specified that his ex-wife was entitled to one-
half of the full future value of his retirement rather than one-half of his
present accrued benefits. The agreement as approved referred to present ac-
crued benefits, but the dollar amount specified for those benefits was the
amount of future entitlement on retirement. The husband was forty-one
years old at the time of the divorce. The court nonetheless held that the ex-
301. Id. at 512.
302. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
303. Birdwell v. Birdwell, 819 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ requested).
304. Id. at 228.
305. 806 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.).
306. Id. at 887.
307. Id. (citing Leal v. Cortez, 569 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ)).
308. Id. at 888 (citing Miller v. Miller, 721 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. 1986)).
309. 799 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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husband failed to prove that the parties had agreed to limit the ex-wife's
entitlement to the value of present accrued benefits, even though the agree-
ment also recited that the award to the ex-wife was "in recognition of the
existence of martial rights in retirement benefits as defined in Berry v.
Berry."310
In Boyett the Dallas court of appeals went on to observe that "child-sup-
port agreements require different consideration from property settlement
agreements."' 31 1 Finality is critical in matters of property whereas the best
interest of children is controlling in connection with their support. 31 2
Hence, the contract is no bar to a judicial order to increase payments for
child support. The court stated, however, that when a property settlement
agreement requires payment of child support and that amount is later re-
duced by court order, the payee under the agreement can recover the differ-
ence in a suit for breach of contract. 3 13 This inconsistent result suggests that
the latter conclusion is unsound. In neither case should breach of contract
be assertable in connection with child support.
D. Making the Division
In Baccus v. Baccus 31 4 both parties appeared before the court in June 1987
and orally agreed to a division of property, though they could not agree on
payment of tax liability. The judge approved the agreement, but it was not
reduced to writing. By the time the parties again appeared before the court
in September 1988, the court found that each party had repudiated the
agreement. The court therefore divided the property on the basis of its pres-
ent value and directed the husband to pay federal tax liabilities. On appeal,
the husband argued that the 1987 agreement somehow fixed the value of the
husband's retirement benefits for purposes of division. The appellate court
put the agreement aside because the agreement was not in writing and had
been repudiated.
In another case before the same court31 5 the dispute centered on the
method for calculating the community interest in a spouse's pension benefits.
The couple had been married over eleven years of the husband's forty-one
years of employment at the date of divorce. The court employed the Tag-
gart316 formula, as refined in May v. May, 317 to define the community inter-
est by applying the ratio of the number of years of marriage to the number of
years of service under the plan, multiplied by the value of the benefit at the
date of divorce. On appeal the wife asserted that the trial court should have
employed the accrued benefit mode of valuing the community interest, so
310. 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983).
311. Hill v. Hill, 819 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 571 (citing Ruhe v. Rowland, 706 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no
writ).
314. 808 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, n.w.h.).
315. Humble v. Humble, 805 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
316. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977).
317. 716 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Corpus Chrisit 1986, no writ).
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that the court should simply subtract the amount to which the pensioner
would have been entitled on the date of marriage from the amount to which
he was entitled at the date of divorce. The appellate court concluded that
the apportionment approach is appropriate to do "substantial justice" 31 8 in
light of the fact that there was not enough evidence in the record to make an
accrued benefit computation. 319 The wife argued that whatever approach is
used to determine the community interest in such cases, the divorce court
abuses its discretion if a division is equal and not made in accordance with
equities of the parties. The appellate court rejected this argument, saying
that "[it] is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to make an equal
division of the property, even where equities balance in favor of the wife." 320
In Knowles v. Knowles321 the ex-wife asserted that a 1975 divorce decree
had erroneously awarded to her ex-husband her interest in military retire-
ment benefits. The appellate court concluded that, apart from the doctrine
of res judicata which precludes questioning the unambiguous 1975 agreed
judgment, the 1990 amendment 322 to the federal law that a state court may
not treat retired pay as property for purposes of division on divorce applies
to prior decrees and therefore does not allow the result sought by the wife. 323
In Irving Fireman's Relief & Retirement Fund v. Sears324 a state public re-
tirement fund resisted an order of a divorce court to make direct payments
of retirement benefits to the ex-wife of a pensioner. The appellate court held
that the provision of the 1989 Texas statute325 that precludes assignment of
public pension benefits and protects them from the pensioner's creditors does
not affect the power of a court to order direct payment of a community
interest to a non-pensioner. The result was the same under the prior statute
which was replaced in 1989.326
In Massey v. Massey 327 the husband attacked the imposition of what was
described as an "owelty judgment", that is, an order to pay a monetary
amount in order to reach a fair apportionment of community assets when
division in kind would not achieve that purpose. Justice Stephens, speaking
for the court, offered a useful amplification of the decision of the Dallas
court in Belz v. Belz, 328 in which he participated. In response to the argu-
ment that Belz stands for the proposition that a money-judgment is generally
inappropriate in a suit for divorce, the judge observed that a money-judg-
ment to equalize the division of the community property on divorce is
proper but the money-judgment in Belz was set aside for other reasons. An
318. 805 S.W.2d at 562 (quoting Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 681 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
319. Id. at 562.
320. Id. at 563 (citing Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1987)).
321. 811 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, n.w.h.).
322. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1988).
323. 811 S.W.2d at 711.
324. 803 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
325. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243e, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
326. 803 S.W.2d at 749-50 (citing Collida v. Collida, 546 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1977, writ denied)).
327. 807 S.W.2d 391, 401-04 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
328. 667 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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order that a party discharge a specific obligation, such as payment of
taxes, 329 may be used for the same purpose330
In Reed v. Reed 331 the El Paso court of appeals saw a somewhat related
situation differently. At divorce, the husband held three interest-bearing
notes owed to the community estate. Two of the notes were secured; one
was not. The divorce court awarded the wife the right to receive all or a
portion of the principal and interest of the three notes with recourse against
the husband for the amounts unpaid. Apparently, this was the court's
means of forcing the husband to collect the notes. The husband complained,
however, that the recourse provision of the award amounted to an award of
alimony. The court also concluded that the recourse rights were new rights
not previously in existence and that making the husband a guarantor
amounts to an award of alimony because his obligation was not tied to the
payment, but rather to the non-payment, of the notes. 332 Although the
facts in Reed are strikingly similar to those of Ex parte Yates,333 which was
not directly relied on by the court, the imposition of the husband's obligation
to pay on default of the notes merely amounted to an award of a money-
payment to equalize the division of community shares. The money-judg-
ment awarded in Massey was also a new obligation of the husband. In Mas-
sey the order that the husband pay the wife a cash amount was justified by
the greater value of assets awarded to him. Presumably an analogous
situtaion was before the court in Reed. The notes were evidentially valued at
their face amount. Rather than awarding the notes to the wife and ordering
her husband to guarantee them, the court should have awarded the notes to
the husband and ordered him to pay his wife an amount commensurate to
their value.334 The El Paso court and other courts asserting similar views
seem to be expressing their disapproval of money-judgments awards. That
point of view, however, should be expressed forthrightly.
The fundamental rule laid down in Eggemeyer33 5 and Cameron336 is that
separate property of a spouse may not be divested by a divorce court. The
most common breach of this rule occurs as a result of mischaracterization of
separate property as community. In Jacobs3 37 the Texas supreme court
made it clear that except in cases of an insubstantial amount, breach of this
329. As in Baccus v. Baccus, 808 S.W.2d 694, 700-702 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991,
n.w.h.). There, the appellate court appears to have felt that the husband's handling of tax
matters was culpable. Thus, ordering him to pay outstanding taxes brought fault into play in
making the division.
330. For recent treatment of taxes and divorce see John A. Miller, Federal Income Taxa-
tion and Community Property Law: The Case for Divorce, 44 Sw. L.J. 1087 (1990); David S.
Dolowitz, Taxation: The Impact of Tax Laws Upon Divorce, 11 FAIRSHARE 2, 9 (no. 7, July
1991), 5 (no. 8, Aug. 1991).
331. 813 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, n.w.h.).
332. Id. at 718-19.
333. 387 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1965).
334. The court in Humble, 805 S.W.2d at 563, said that a court is not required to fix a
specific value of assets whose division is not subject to material dispute.
335. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977) (as to realty).
336. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 220 (Tex. 1982) (as to personalty).
337. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1985).
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rule requires reversal. As Justice Dunn points out in her dissent in Magill v.
Magill,338 the majority of the court in its refusal to reverse by imposing its
own assessment of an equitable division misstated the rule339 rather than
focusing on the insubstantiality of the amount.
Although separate property of a spouse is not divisible by the court as an
incident of the divorce settlement, a divorce court as a court of general juris-
diction may nonetheless deal with separate property interests at the same
time. Thus, the divorce court dealt with a fraudulent transfer of separate
property in Jones v. Jones340 and made a partition of separate interests in
realty in Halamka v. Halamka.341 More commonly, a divorce court im-
poses a lien on separate property as security for payment of a money judg-
ment rendered to equalize division of the community estate or to satisfy a
claim for reimbursement. The complaint is then made that the lien consti-
tutes a forbidden division of separate property. There is no significant dis-
pute that a lien may be fixed on separate property, even separate homestead
property, 342 to secure compensation for benefits received by that property,
but in spite of substantial authority to the contrary, 343 the view is still some-
times expressed that a lien should not be fixed on separate property except as
security for benefits received by that property. 344 A justification of the con-
trary view is that such a lien does not constitute a taking of separate prop-
erty except by the voluntary allowance of the owner because foreclosure
occurs only when the owner deliberately ignores the court's order to make
the payment that the lien secures. 345 The Houston First District appellate
court has justified such a lien by terming it "equitable" and stating that such
a lien is not subject to foreclosure.3 46 This terminology and its consequence
are misleading. The phrase "equitable lien" is ordinarily employed in the
process of asserting a lien for reimbursement by making the argument that
equity imposes a lien, or charge, on property which receives a benefit to
secure compensation for that benefit. But once the court goes a step further
and imposes a lien by judgment, that lien may be foreclosed. If the judgment
is recorded in the county where the realty is located, third persons thereby
338. 816 S.W.2d 530, 536-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, writ requested).
339. Id. at 533.
340. 804 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, n.w.h.).
341. 799 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
342. See Magill v. Magill, 816 S.W.2d 530, 535, 537 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
writ requested).
343. Mullins v. Mullins, 785 S.W.2d 5, 11-12 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ);
Hirsch v. Hirsch, 770 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ). Dewey v. Dewey,
745 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); In re Jackson, 506
S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ denied); Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d
338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974; no writ); Weaks v. Weaks, 471 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ denied).
344. See Johnson v. Johnson, 804 S.W.2d 296, 299-300 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1991, n.w.h.).
345. See Joseph W. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, ST. MARY'S
L.J. 413, 446-47 (1976).
346. Shields v. Shields, No. 01-90-00141-CV (unpublished) (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.). "An equitable lien merely insures the payment of a debt out of the pro-
ceeds of any future sale of the property." Id. op. at 24.
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acquire constructive notice of the lien. Putting such a lien on personalty is
meaningless, however, and the Texas supreme court said in Jensen v. Jen-
sen 347 that the court should award a money judgment for benefits rendered
to separate property.
An award of attorney's fees is an integral part of the process of division of
community property on divorce. 348 Although a plea for general relief is suf-
ficient to authorize an award of attorney's fees directly to an attorney, 349
better practice supports greater specificity in naming the attorney. 3 50
Although it is improper for an attorney to sue his own client for a fee in a
divorce proceeding, 35 I a party's prior attorney frequently intervenes to assert
such a claim. Service of notice of such an intervention must be had on the
former client unless she responds to the intervention. 352
E. Appeal
After a default judgment for divorce has been granted to the petitioner,
the respondent's motion for new trial must allege a meritorious defense and
establish the facts relied on by affidavit. 353 Since those prerequisites were
not met, the trial court in Liepelt v. Oliveira 354 properly held a hearing on
the respondent's motion and divided the community estate. In Butler v. But-
ler 355 the trial court entered a post-answer default judgment and the respon-
dent appealed by writ of error. His writ failed, however, because the
invalidity of the judgment was not disclosed by the record. The appellant's
principal argument was that he failed to get notice of the trial setting, but the
record did not show this alleged fact. Because notice of a trial setting need
not be included in the transcript (as was the case in Butler), its absence was
not error on the face of the record. 35 6 A cost bond must be timely filed for
an appeal. In Eichelberger v. Hayton 35 7 the court was careful to distinguish
the dispensing with a bond in disputes involving spouses3 58 and the require-
ment of a bond in cases involving ex-spouses. 35 9 Thus, an injunction granted
without the prerequisite bond in the latter type of case is void. A sequel to
the Massey case involved a claim for arrears of temporary spousal support
pending appeal. 36° The appellate court held that the trial court's order
under section 3.58(h)(1) of the Family Code3 6 1 will support a money judg-
347, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984).
348. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950).
349. Kirk v. Kirk, 805 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
350. Id. at 931-32.
351. See McKnight, supra note 15, at 44.
352. Mallia v. Bousquet, 813 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
n.w.h.).
353. Liepelt v. Oliveira, 818 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.).
354. Id. at 77.
355. 808 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
356. Id. at 129.
357. 814 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
358. TEX. R. Civ. P. 693a.
359. TEX. R. Civ. P. 694.
360. Massey v. Massey, 813 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
361. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(h)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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ment under section 3.74(b) 362 in the absence of any order of the appellate
court superseding the order of the trial court.363 The court pointed out that
in his principal appeal the appellant might have appealed the award of
spousal support, but, because of his failure to do so, he could not complain
that the trial court's order to pay was not a final order.3 64
Another appeal of a post divorce dispute365 turned on the timeliness of
filing a cost bond for appeal. The judgment appealed from was entered in
October 1989. The appeal bond was filed in June 1990. Although there was
a nunc pro tunc judgment signed in May 1990 to correct a clerical error, the
latter judgment did not extend the time for perfecting the appeal. 366
F. Post-Divorce Disputes
Phillips v. Parrish367 dealt with a 1976 divorce decree incorporating a
property settlement agreement which did not mention pension benefits spe-
cifically but provided that the husband have "any and all personal property
and effects in [his] possession." As in other cases involving similar decretal
language, a pension interest was not construed as coming within the descrip-
tion.368 A residuary clause in the agreement, however, provided that com-
munity property not mentioned specifically should belong to the parties
equally. Matters of contractual interpretation apart, there was apparently
no contest as to the amount of the base pension awarded to the ex-wife. The
ex-husband merely contested her entitlement to cost of living increases in his
pension as well as "bridge benefits" which supplemented the amount of
monthly benefits payable from the date of retirement through age sixty-two
when Social Security benefits commence. In accordance with the decision in
Grier v. Grier369 the ex-wife was entitled to an interest in those benefits.370
Subsequent changes in the law or sharpening of prior legal concepts do
not allow the courts to reapply the law to alter prior judgments. In Haworth
v. Haworth 371 the husband sought clarification of a 1980 divorce decree di-
viding his private pension rights to correct an award of a separate property
portion of his benefits as defined in Berry v. Berry.372 If the division had
been regarded as erroneous, it could have been rectified on appeal, but with-
out an appeal the judgment had to stand under the principle of res judicata.
A somewhat similar attack was made on a 1979 decree in Elliott v. Elliott.373
The ex-husband sought to overturn an order antedating the Uniformed Serv-
ices Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) with respect to military re-
362. Id. § 3.74(b).
363. 813 S.W.2d at 606 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 3.58(i)).
364. Id.
365. Holder v. Holder, 808 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, n.w.h.).
366. Id. at 198.
367. 814 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
368. Id. at 504.
369. 731 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex. 1987).
370. 814 S.W.2d at 505.
371. 795 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
372. 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983).
373. 797 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
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tirement benefits. His plea met the same response. The decree was res
judicata though its division of "gross military retirement benefits" went far
beyond the limits prescribed by USFSPA and could have been attacked on
appeal. 374 The court also stated that in a proceeding to clarify a divorce
decrees under Family Code section 3.7 1375 an affirmative plea of res judicata
is not required under the motion-practice prevailing in such instances.376
Good practice, nevertheless, suggests strict adherence to the Rules of Civil
Procedure as Family Code section 3.70(b) provides. 377
In Ware v. Ware 378 an argument of res judicata was interposed to a post-
divorce suit for partition of realty which the former spouses had been or-
dered to sell at an amount specified in their divorce decree. The decree had
not specified a remedy if the property could not be sold for the amount speci-
fied. The principle of res judicata was, therefore, inapplicable, and an order
to sell the property on other terms in order to divide the proceeds was ac-
cordingly appropriate. In Rittgers v. Rittgers,379 on the other hand, the ex-
spouses had reached an oral agreement, which under the circumstances was
unenforceable, for the purchase of one spouse's share of undivided realty by
the other. Again, a partition of the property to resolve a dispute unantici-
pated by the divorce decree was an appropriate remedy. 380 The court also
noted that an award of attorney's fees to an appellee in such an instance
must be predicated on the failure of the appellant's appeal. 38'
In another matter38 2 that had involved a prior appeal,3 8 3 the court consid-
ered the original decree providing for an equal, in kind division of commu-
nity furniture as the parties should agree and a further order for
appointment of a receiver to make the division if they could not agree. The
ex-wife asserted that the initial order for equal division of the furniture was
not a final but an interlocutory order, an issue inferentially resolved in the
previous appeal. 38 4 The Dallas appellate court concluded that the ex-wife
had prosecuted this appeal for delay and without sufficient cause and sanc-
tioned her by awarding damages to the ex-husband in the amount of ten
times the total taxable costs.3 8 5 The Dallas court also applied sanctions in
response to another frivolous appeal, 386 as evidenced by appellant-counsel's
lack of preparation to meet the well established authorities cited by the ap-
pellee to sustain the trial court's judgment. In reaching the conclusion that
374. Id. at 390-91. See Daniel L. Driscoll, Mansell v. Mansell: How It Changed the Defini-
tion of Marital Property for the Military Spouse, 30 J. FAM. L. 97 (1991).
375. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.71 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
376. 797 S.W.2d at 391-92.
377. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
378. 809 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, n.w.h.).
379. 802 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1990, n.w.h.).
380. Id. at 113-14.
381. Id. at 115.
382. Young v. Young, 810 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.).
383. Young v. Young, 765 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
384. 810 S.W.2d at 852.
385. Id.
386. Naydan v. Naydan, 800 S.W.2d 637, 643-44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, n.w.h.).
1992] 1869
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the appeal had been "taken for delay,"38 7 the court found that the appel-
lant's counsel could not have had any reasonable grounds for reversal in the
light of existing precedents which he deliberately ignored.38 8 The appellate
court therefore assessed damages of ten percent of the trial court's monetary
judgment against the appellant.38 9
In re Ward 390 was a simpler sort of dispute though rooted in a decree of
1974. The ex-wife brought suit for enforcement of an order that her former
husband pay a portion of his monthly military retirement benefits to her.
Payments had been in arrears since 1976. Applying the ten-year statute for
validity of judgments39 ' as though it were a statute of limitation, the court
held that the statute runs on each benefit as it becomes due, thus leaving
payments received during the last ten years unaffected.
In Nix v. Nix392 the parties were divorced in 1971. In 1986 the ex-wife
brought suit against her former husband for conversion and fraud in connec-
tion with his failure to comply with a property settlement agreement reached
in conjunction with the divorce decree. On his own motion, the district
judge in whose court the matter was commenced transferred the case to the
county court having jurisdiction of family law cases and matters in contro-
versy not exceeding $50,000. Both parties stipulated that more than
$100,000 was in controversy, and both filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the
county court. 39 3 In an appeal from a contrary ruling by the county court,
the Corpus Christi court of appeals concluded that the amount in issue not
only exceeded the court's jurisdiction but the dispute was not "a family law
case or proceeding". 394 The suit was merely for a breach of contract as well
as conversion and fraud.
G. Effect of Bankruptcy
About eight years before the ex-husband filed for bankruptcy in In re
Robinson,3 95 he had been divorced. Prior to the entry of the divorce decree
the couple had entered into a settlement agreement by which the wife agreed
that the husband would take most of the assets of the marriage and custody
of their only child, and the husband agreed to make an initial lump sum
payment, another at the end of ten years, and monthly support payments to
the wife. In his federal income tax return for 1982, 1983, and 1984 the ex-
husband deducted the monthly payments as alimony, but in 1985 he ceased
making the payments. After filing for bankruptcy, the ex-husband claimed
that his obligation was based on a division of property and was therefore
387. TEX. R. Civ. P. 84.
388. 800 S.W.2d at 643, citing Beckham v. City Wide Air Conditioning Co., 695 S.W.2d
660, 663 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
389. 800 S.W.2d at 644.
390. 806 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, n.w.h.).
391. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.006 (Vernon 1985).
392. 797 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, n.w.h.).
393. Id. at 65.
394. Id.
395. 122 B.R. 502 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
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dischargeable. His ex-wife argued that it was for her support and not dis-
chargeable. The bankruptcy court stated that "the primary issue in deter-
mining whether the obligation is for support and maintenance or part of a
property division is the intent of the parties. ' 396 In this instance, however,
the evidence was too sparse for a very meaningful application of the usual
standard.397 On its face the agreement itself indicated both objectives. The
court attached some significance to the fact that the wife received very little
property at the time of divorce and that the wife lacked the skill to support
herself at the standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage. In
concluding that the agreement was for support and a property division, 398
the court attached particular importance to the fact that the ex-husband had
treated the payments under the agreement as alimony on his own tax re-
turns; thus, he "should be estopped from now asserting [that] these pay-
ments were [for] mere property settlement. '399
In In re Davidson 4w similar facts were somewhat better developed in
favor of the ex-wife. Referring to Robinson and the ground in the decision
as "quasi estoppel", 401 the court concluded that the bankrupt debtor's obli-
gation to his ex-wife was not dischargeable. Relying on the principle of
quasi estoppel, the court said it was unnecessary to consider the intent of the
parties when they made the agreement. 4°2 The court also stressed the detri-
mental reliance of the ex-wife on the ex-husband's handling of tax liability
under the agreement. 4° 3 In the light of a further provision in the agreement
that either party would be entitled to attorney's fees to handle default of an
obligation, the court ruled that the ex-wife was entitled to reasonable attor-
ney's fees in connection with the bankruptcy proceeding. 404
396. Id. at 505 (citing In re Billingsley, 93 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.(1987)).
397. 122 B.R. at 505 (where the standards are enumerated).
398. Id. at 506.
399. Id.
400. 947 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1991).
401, Id. at 1297.
402. Id. n.6.
403. In Robinson there was no evidence as to how the ex-wife handled her tax liability. 122
B.R. at 504-05.
404. 947 F.2d at 1297-98,
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